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FEDERAL TAXATION OF INSURANCE TRUSTS

Allan F. Smith*
"· .. Every signpost points to increased and increasing taxes.
Taxpayers may in a few years look back at the Revenue .A.ct of
1940 with the nostalgia of taxpayers remembering in 1918 the
happy days of 1916." 1

W

HILE these words are not designed to cheer the hearts of taxconscious citizens, probably few will deny that they constitute
a valid interpretation of the "signposts" along the road. The treasury
surplus of 192 5 which led to the reduction of income and estate tax
rates in the Revenue Act of 1926 and the repeal of the gift tax in the
same year 2 does not seem to be an event likely to recur in the near
future. On the contrary, with increasing deficits and expanded spending programs, new sources of revenue will be sought, new principles
of taxation may be applied, and changes in administrative policy may
be expected 8 with each passing month. The form which these changes
may take is a matter o:F speculation/ but it is at least possible that a
further attack may be made on the two instrumentalities which are at
present the main havens for those seeking to minimize tax burdenslife insurance and the trust. The legislative and administrative attack on
the latter has been constant since the insertion of section 219 (g) and
(h) in the Revenue Act of 1924/ It is still true today, as in 1933, that
"One can read in the revisions of the revenue acts the record of the
Government's endeavor to keep pace with the fertility of invention
whereby taxpayers had contrived to keep the larger benefits of owner-

* A.B., Nebraska State Teachers College; LL.B., University of Nebraska; LL.M.,
University of Michigan.-Ed.
1
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES vi (1940).
2
Magill, "The Federal Gift Tax," 40 CoL. L. REV. 773 at 774 (1940).
8
Witness the frequent administrative changes under § 8II (g) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 (hereinafter cited I. R. C.), 53 Stat. L. l at 120, 26 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 8 II (g), discussed infra, pp. 223-225.
~ This article was prepared prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of 1941, which
gives some indication of the methods which may be used to increase revenue. So far
as the gift tax and estate tax are concerned, the changes serve only to increase the rates
of taxation and to make the defense tax permanent. See H. R. 5417, Pub. L. 250,
77th Cong., ISt sess. (1941), §§ 401, 402. The income tax provisions, although
they involve some innovations, involve no changes pertinent to this discussion.
11
Now I. R. C. (1939), §§ 166, 167.
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ship and be relieved of the attendant burdens." 6 The attack on the
preferred tax status of insurance has started, and while it is likely that
the taxability of insurance will be altered in the future, whether the
changes will be toward clarification of the statutes and regulations 7
or an assault upon its preferred tax status remains to be seen. There
appear to be sound reasons of policy for a continuance of the preferential treatment generally accorded life insurance,8 even though the
result of such preference be to cause life insurance to be regarded as
a "mechanism of tax avoidance" 9 rather than as serving its original
social functions of preserving estates and providing for dependents.
It is not the purpose of this article, however, either to justify the
present tax status of insurance policies generally or to discuss the tax
status of all trusts. Nor is it proposed to suggest the routes by which
changes in the present status should be accomplished. Rather, the scope
of the article is limited to an institution of comparatively recent origin 10
in which both of these tax-avoiding instrumentalities are involvedthat is, the life insurance trust.11 Because both insurance trusts and
other trusts are taxed by the same provisions of the statutes, it is obviously impossible to exclude all cases involving trusts which do not
contain insurance as a part of the corpus or to exclude all cases involving insurance not placed in trust. Indeed, many of the rules of taxation apply irrespective of the nature of the corpus of the trust. An
effort will be made, however, to center attention on just those cases
which do involve insurance held under a trust agreement, particularly
if there are special rules applicable to this type of property arrangement. And, within the field of life insurance trusts, the discussion will
be limited to a survey of (I) the present tax aspects under the federal
6
Cardozo, J., in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 at 675-676, 53 S. Ct. 761
(1933).
1
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES 352 (1940), in regard
to income tax provisions, says: "Life insurance is a complex bundle of mathematics and
legalism, and is not rendered any more simple by the necessity of providing, as in the
case of wills, for a myriad of subjunctive eventualities. Words of art abound, and a
wealth of specially directed language embodying years of judicial definition is all we
have for tax statute and regulations."
8
Elrod, "Taxation of Insurance Proceeds-State Inheritance and Estate Taxes,"
18 TAXES 668 at 698 et seq. (1940), points out admirably the social purposes served
by life insurance justifying its continued preferential treatment, citing Holcombe,
"Economical Functions of Insurance," I YALE INSURANCE LECTURES 39 (1904),
and HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 379 (1928) [cf. 1935 ed., 558].
9 PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES 351 (1940).
10 It is not literally true that it is of recent origin, but its growth was not large
until 1920. See ScuLLY, INSURANCE TRUSTS, c. I (1927).
11 For the sake of brevity, only the personal insurance trust will be considered.
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income, estate, and gift taxes; and (2) the possible tax savings by
judicious use of such trusts, with only incidental reference to legislative
or judicial innovations which may, in the future, render this article
of only historical interest.
The life insurance trust may take many forms 12 and serve a variety
of purposes,111 but for present purposes it may be defined as a trust, at
least part of the corpus of which is a policy of life insurance,14 in which
the duty of the trustee is to receive the proceeds of such policy and
administer such proceeds as a trust. Such a trust, like any other, may be
revocable or irrevocable, and may be funded or unfunded.15 These
various types will be considered separately only where the tax results
vary with the type. The present objective is to survey the problems
which may arise in the three major fields of federal taxation and to
determine the solutions which have been pronounced.

I
THE INCOME TAX

The principal problems raised with respect to the federal income
tax and life insurance trusts are: (I) the taxability of the income of a
funded life insurance trust to the grantor thereof; and (2) the taxability or exemption of the proceeds of life insurance and endowment
policies.

12
See STEPHENSON, LIVING TRUSTS, 2d ed., 21-26 (1937); HORTON, LIFE
INSURANCE TRUSTS (1933).
18
See STEPHENSON, LIVING TRUSTS, 2d ed., 64-100 (1937).
14 Any kind of policy may be used, although it is not common to place endowment contracts or policies calling for instalment payments in an insurance trust. The
policy may be on the life of the grantor or on the life of another.
15 The unfunded trust is one in which only the insurance policies constitute the
corpus of the trust. The policies are either assigned to the trustee or the trustee is
made beneficiary of the policies. The trust instrument provides for disposition of the
proceeds upon the death of the insured, and normally the insured continues to pay
the premiums on the policies from his own funds. The funded trust arises when, in
addition to the insurance policies, the grantor of the trust transfers to the trustee
certain income-producing property which forms a part of the corpus of the trust. The
trustee is directed to use the income from such other property to pay the premiums on
the insurance in the trust. There are other classifications which can be made: revocable
and irrevocable; business and personal; passive, cumulative, discretionary, etc., but
these terms are designed only to differentiate certain features which may be present
in the trust agreement or the various powers retained by the grantor or given to the
trustee.
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A. The Taxability of the Income of a Funded Insurance
Trust to the Grantor
By virtue of a specific taxing statute, the income of a funded insurance trust is to be taxed to the grantor thereof. Section r67 of the
Internal Revenue Code of r 93 9 provides:
"(a) Where any part of the income of a trust" ( r) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not
having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part
of the income may be, held or accumulated for future distribution
to the grantor; or
"(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not
h;ving a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part
of the income, be distributed to the grantor; or
"(3) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person
not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such
part of the income may be, applied to the payment of premiums
upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor ( except policies of insurance irrevocably payable for the purposes and in the
manner specified in section 2 3 ( o), relating to the so-called
'charitable contribution' deduction) ;
then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor.
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'in the discretion of the
grantor' means 'in the discretion of the grantor, either alone or
in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse
interest in the disposition of the part of the income in question.' "
r. Constitutionality and Application of the Present Statute
It is apparent that this section supplements section r 66 16 by proI. R. C. (1939), § 166, reads as follows:
''Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title to any part of the
corpus of the trust is vested" ( 1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income
therefrom, or
"(2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of
such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, then the income of such part of
the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor."
Cases are legion in which the courts have attempted to mark out what constitutes a "power to revest'' and "a substantial adverse interest." It is apparent that this
section, as well as § 167 (a) (3), will render the income of a life insurance trust
taxable to the grantor. Space does not permit an extensive treatment of this section.
It has been fully covered in PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES
166-295 (1940).
16
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viding for taxability of trust income to the grantor where he retains
control of the income of the trust although detaching himself from any
control of the corpus. Although it does not specifically refer to irrevocable trusts, there is no question but that subsection 3 applies to
irrevocable 17 as well as revocable 18 insurance trusts. In the remainder
of this discussion, it will be asswned, unless otherwise indicated, that
the life insurance trust has been made sufficiently irrevocable as to be
outside the scope of section I 66, and we are concerned only with the
application of section I 67 (a) (3). The substantial portions of this
provision appeared first in 1924,19 and the provision has direct and
particular application to funded life insurance trusts. Justice Cardozo,
in passing on the constitutionality of the act, in Burnet v. W ells,2° said,
"The meaning of the statute is not doubtful, whatever may be said of
its validity." Today, since the handing down of that decision, the reverse seems true, for, although there are still some questions as to the
meaning of the statute, there is now no question of its validity.
It is doubtful whether a taxpayer could have found a stronger case
to test the validity of the statute than the Wells case. Wells created
at various times five irrevocable funded insurance trusts, reserving no
control whatever over the management of the trusts. The policies
included in the trusts were transferred to the trustee as e:ffectively as
can be done: some by a change of beneficiary with a renunciation of a
power to change beneficiaries; some by assignment of the policies plus
an irrevocable change of beneficiary. Only upon extremely remote
contingencies could the corpus revert to his estate and never during his
lifetime. The Court, by a five-four decision, upheld the commissioner's
deficiency assessment and the constitutionality of the act, saying: 21
"The controversy is one as to the boundaries of legislative
power. It must be dealt with in a large way, as questions of due
process always are, not narrowly or pedantically, in slavery to
17

Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1933); Edward E. Rieck,
41 B. T. A. 457 (1940).
18

As indicated above, the income from a revocable insurance trust will be taxed
to the grantor under § 166 without the necessity of looking to § 167 (a) (3). See
George H. Whiteley, Jr., 42 B. T. A. 402 (1940); William J. Garland, 42 B. T. A.

324 (1940).
19
Revenue Act of 1924, § 219 (h), 43 Stat. L. 277. The same substantial
provisions appear in the Revenue Acts of 1926, § 219 (h), 44 Stat. L. 35; 1928, § 167,
45 Stat. L. 840; 1932, 1934, 1936, and 1938, § 167 (a) (3), 47 Stat. L. 221, 48
Stat. L. 728, 49 Stat. L. I 708, 52 Stat. L. 5I 9.
20
289 U.S. 670 at 675, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1933).
21
Id., 289 U. S. at 677-678, 681-682.
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forms and phrases. . . . Liability does not have to rest upon the
enjoyment by the taxpayer of all the privileges and benefits enjoyed by the most favored owner at a given time or place.•••
"Trusts for the preservation of policies of insurance involve
a continuing exercise by the settlor of a power to direct the application of the income along predetermined channels. In this they
are. to be distinguished from trusts where the income of a fund,
though payable to wife or kin, may be expended by the beneficiaries without restraint, may be given away or squandered, the
founder of the trust doing nothing to impose his will upon the
use. . • .
"Congress does not play the despot in ordaining that trusts for
such uses, if created in the future, shall be treated for the purpose
of taxation as if the income of the trust had been retained by the
grantor."
In view of this declaration it is apparent that the normal funded
life insurance trust, even though irrevocable in the strictest sense, renders the grantor liable for tax upon the income. It does not matter
whether the insurance be ordinary life insurance or endowment contracts. 22 However, the dividends received by the trustee and applied
to the payment of premiums are not considered "income." 23 Nor is the
grantor liable for sums which he contributes to the trust for the purpose
of making up a deficiency in the income.24
There still remain some questions as to the meaning of the various
parts of the statute.
2.

What is "Insurance on the Life of the Grantor''?

By its terms, the statute taxes the income to the grantor of the
trust only if the insurance is "on the life of the grantor." The wording
of the statute opened the way for avoidance by placing insurance in
the trust which is not on the life of the grantor thereof. Such an arrangement is certainly not covered by the literal words of the statute,
and there are cases which permit this method of avoiding the tax.25
But it would be a bold prophet who would assert that such condition
would remain for long on the statute books. He would be only slightly
22

Heffelfinger v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 9(}1.
Percy M. Chandler, 41 B. T. A. 165 (1940), affd. Chandler v. Commissioner,
(C. C. A. 3d, 1941) II9 F. (2d) 623.
28

241d.
25
Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 B. T. A. 591 (1934); Gail H. Baldwin, 36 B. T. A.

364 (1937). See, particularly, the very recent case of Frances S. Willson, 44 B. T. A.
583 (1941).
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less bold who would assert that even under the present statute a taxpayer can be absolutely certain of escaping income taxation on the
income of a funded insurance trust by the simple expedient of using
insurance on the life of another.
In the first place, he may be taxable under section 166 if he retains
a power to revest the title to the corpus in himself.26 He may be taxable
under section 167 (a) ( 1) if the income is accumulated and there is
some chance of his recapturing the corpus.21 But beyond those possibilities, transactions which appear to have been arranged for the special
purpose of avoiding income taxation, particularly where they involve
close family relationships, are being subjected to close scrutiny, and
the courts and taxing authorities may go beyond the literal words of
the statute. Thus in Purdon Smith Whiteley,2 8 petitioner and her
brother executed cross trusts. The trust created by the brother contained policies of insurance on petitioner's life, income-producing stock:,
and a note of petitioner.29 The income of this trust was to be used for
the payment of the premiums of insurance, and any balance was to be
distributed to the petitioner. Petitioner was named cotrustee of the
trust, and given power to call for any part of the corpus of the trust,
subject to the consent of the grantor (her brother). The board held
that the entire income of the trust was taxable to the petitioner, because
she was the real grantor of the trust, saying: "we having held that
petitioner should be regarded as the grantor of the trust within the
meaning of section 166, it follows that so much of the income of the
trust as was used to pay premiums on the policies of insurance covering petitioner's life is also taxable to her under the provisions of section

167 (a) (3)." 30
Again, in Henry A. B. Dunning,31 the facts showed that petitioner
had recently assigned policies of insurance upon his own life to his
wife, and she, in turn, had placed the policies in an insurance trust.
The petitioner then created an irrevocable trust, the income of which
was to be paid to the wife, and at the "suggestion" of petitioner the
26

William J. Garland, 42 B. T. A. 324 (1940).
William Lea Taylor, 37 B. T. A. 875 (1938); Margaret R. Phipps, 42
B. T. A. 329 (1940).
28
42 B. T. A. 316 (1940). Cf. Margaret R. Phipps, 42 B. T. A. 329 (1940).
29 It was not shown whether this note was supported by consideration or not. For
an interesting case where a taxpayer sought unsuccessfully to obtain an interest deduction by giving his own note to an insurance trust set up by his wife (the policies being
on his life), see Johnson v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 710.
80
42 B. T. A. at 324.
81
36 B. T. A. 1222 (1937).
21
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wife used that income to pay the premiums on the policies which she
owned. The board held, despite the fact that the wife was not required
to use the income for the insurance premiums, that so much of the
income as had been used for that purpose was taxable to the petitioner.82
A still further possibility for income tax liability appears in Commissioner v. Morton. 83 In that case a husband took out $275,000 worth
of insurance on his own life payable to his wife, and she alone had any
powers in connection with the policies. His wife, as grantor, set up a
trust of securities the income from which was to be used to pay the
premiums on the policies. The trust was to terminate at the death of
the wife (grantor ), her husband (insured), or their daughter. The
husband was given a power of revocation. Subsequently a similar trust
was created by the wife for another insurance policy on the life of her
husband but the policy was payable to the trustee rather than to her.
Thus, none of the policies was on the life of the grantor, but the court
held that the income of both trusts was taxable to the petitioner
(grantor), relying in part on Douglas v. Willcuts. 84 The opinion
states: 35
"It is obvious that the income of these trusts was devoted
solely to the grantor's own uses. She was the sole beneficiary of
the eight policies involved in the first trust; she alone had the
right to change the beneficiary; she alone was entitled to their
cash surrender or loan value. With respect to the second trust,
her title was somewhat less direct, but the policy was, in fact,
payable to her, even though indirectly through the medium of
the trustee. . . ."
Admitting that a literal interpretation might exclude this case from the
operation of section 167, the court said: 36
". . . no such literal interpretation is to be accorded the section.
Looking to the practical facts, we find here the bulk of the income
did remain, in contemplation of law, in substance, that of the
grantor, used to purchase property for herself."
It thus appears that if the grantor of the trust has real interest in the
policies which constitute the corpus of the trust, the income may
32

The commissioner later sought to tax this grantor on the entire income of the
, trust, but was unsuccessful. 41 B. T. A. IIOl (1940).
83 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 1005. See also, William Lea Taylor, 37
B. T. A. 875 (1938).
34
296 u. s. 1, 56 s. Ct. 59 (1935).
85 108 F. (2d) at 1007.
36
Id. at 1007-1008.
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be taxed to him even though they are not strictly "on the life of the
grantor." In the light of Hel'Vering v. Clifford,3 1 this reasoning will
probably be upheld.

3. Excess Income which "May Be Applied"
The statute by its terms purports to tax all income which may be
applied to the payment of premiums on life insurance. In actual practice this particular clause is not so broadly construed.38 The mere provision in a trust indenture that the trustees "may invest in and/or pay
the premiums upon any life insurance contracts or annuities for the
benefit or welfare of any beneficiary . . . hereunder" is not enough
to make the grantor liable to taxation on the income of the trust. 89 This
provision was inserted in the trust instrument involved in Genevieve
F. Moore.-4· 0 No policies of insurance had ever been taken out, and the
board refused to hold the grantor liable, saying: 41
"While on its face section I 67 might appear to apply, it has, so
far as can be discovered, never been considered applicable even
by the respondent as broadly as is now suggested. In Charles
Stewart Mott,4 2 where the Board held that payments which could
have been made upon life insurance policies were to be taxed to
the grantor, it is evident that respondent made no effort to tax
the entire income of the trust to him, but only the comparatively
small proportion which represented premiums on insurance policies then in force. . ..
"It follows that application of the provision in question depends upon the existence in the tax year of policies upon which
87
309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940); noted in 53 HARV. L. REv. 1050
(1940); 38 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1940); 49 YALE L. J. 1305 (1940); Ray, "The
Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1322 (1940);
24 MINN. L. REV. 1005 (1940).
88
In construing § 166 the courts have adopted a literal construction and are
concerned only with what may be done by the grantor. See Greenough v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. ISt, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 25.
89
A fortiori there is no basis for taxing the grantor on the income when there
is not even such a provision in the trust instrument, and no policies are taken out.
In Corning v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 329, the government
sought to impose income tax on the grantor merely upon a showing that there was a
general power in the trustee to "invest'' the funds and a further showing that the
trustee could choose insurance as an investment without liability under the state laws.
See also, Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99 (1940); George H. Deuble, 42 B. T. A.
277 (1940).
40
39 B. T. A. 808 (1939).
41 Id. at 812-813.
42
30 B. T. A. 1040 (1934), discussed below.
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it would have been physically possible for the trustees to pay
premiums and upon the amount of the premiums so payable."
These two limitations-( I) that there must be policies in existence,
and ( 2) that liability is limited to the am:ount actually used for life
insurance premiums-appear to be engrafted on the statute. Whether
there are policies• in existence upon which the premiums may be paid
may depend upon a construction of the instrument. In the Mott case
(referred to in the above quotation), the grantor-trustee was authorized
to pay premiums on policies which "may be taken out for the benefit
of the beneficiary of the trust." At the time, the grantor of the trust
already had taken out policies in favor of the beneficiaries of the trust,
although such policies were not a part of the trust corpus. As indicated,
the Board of Tax Appeals construed the instrument to mean that the
trustee was authorized to pay premiums on those policies, even though
they did not constitute a part of the trust corpus, and imposed liability
to the extent of the total premiums on such insurance. This decision,
however, was reversed by the circuit court of appeals,4 8 on the basis
that the instrument did not authorize the payment of premiums upon
existing policies, but only upon such policies as might be taken out in
the future.
Liability was limited to the amount actually expended for premiums
on insurance in Rand v. Conimissioner.44 In that case the grantortrustee was not specifically authorized to pay premiums and no policies
constituted a part of the corpus of the trust. Nevertheless, in the tax
years I934 and I935, the trustee "invested" 45 substantial portions of
the income in insurance policies, payable to himself as trustee for his
children ( the beneficiaries of the trust). He was held liable on the
income of the trust only to the extent of the amount so paid as
premiums.4 6 The board found an implied power to invest in insurance
because it is "inconceivable that his action as trustee can be viewed as
inconsistent with his intention as grantor since he is the same individual
43

(C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 315.
40 B. T. A. 233 (1939), affd. sub. nom. Rand v. Helvering, (C. C. A. 8th,
1941) u6 F. (2d) 929. See Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99 (1940), where the
grantor was relieved of liability entirely when his wife (life beneficiary of the income
of the trust) used some of the income to purchase insurance on grantor's life in favor
of the children ( remainder beneficiaries under the trust).
45
Whether the payment of life insurance premiums is an "investment" in trust
property does not seem settled. Compare the language in William Lea Taylor, 37
B. T. A. 875 at 880 (1938): "The payment of insurance premiums out of the income
is but an investment in trust property," with the language in Corning v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 329 at 333: "The payment of life insurance
premiums on the life of the grantor is not an investment of the funds of the trust."
46
Cf. Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99 (1940).
44
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in both instances, though acting in different capacities." 47 The decision
was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
In the ordinary funded trust, it is impossible to determine the exact
income which will be produced by the securities, and there will usually
be an excess of income over the amount necessary to pay the premiums
on the insurance policies. Is this excess taxable to the grantor under
any circumstances? There appear at least four possible dispositions
which can be made of such excess income. It may be directed ( r) that
such excess income be distributed to the grantor; ( 2) that such excess
income be distributed to a named beneficiary; (3) that such excess income
be accumulated and added to the corpus of the trust; ( 4) that such excess
income be applied to the purchase of additional insurance. In the absence of any such express direction, the trustee may be given discretionary power to apply the excess income in any of the four ways. The
person to whom this excess income may be taxed depends, of course,
upon the general principles of taxing trust income,48 and only a summary can be made here. If it is, by the terms of the trust, to be distributed to the grantor, it is taxable to him. 49 Likewise, if, in the
discretion of one nothavingasubstantialadverse interest, it may be distributed to him, it is taxable to him. 50 If it is accumulated and added to
the corpus, but the grantor may recapture the corpus, it is taxable to
him. 51 If the excess is distributed to a named beneficiary and the trust
is irrevocable, then it is income to the beneficiary, not to the grantor.52
Conversely, if the trust is revocable, the income is taxable to the
grantor. 58 If the excess is used to purchase additional insurance, on the
life of the grantor, it is taxable to him.5 4 If the excess income is not
taxable to the grantor, then it will be taxed either to the trust or the
beneficiary, depending upon conditions which need not concern us here.
47
40 B. T. A. at 238. See also Heffelfinger v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 8th,
1937) 87 F. (2d) 991. But see Commissioner v. Morton, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940)
108 F. (2d) 1005.
48
I. R. C. (1939), §§ 161-167.
19
I. R. C. (1939), § 167 (a) (2).
50 Id.
51
I. R. C. (1939), § 167 (a) (1); William Lea Taylor, 37 B. T. A. 875
(1938).
52
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1933); Edward E. Rieck,
41 B. T. A. 457 (1940), affd. Rieck v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) u8 F.
(2d) 110.
58
I. R. C. (1939), § 166; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336
(1930); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 53 S. Ct. 570 (1933); Carkhuff v.
Commissioner, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 626, cert. den. 299 U. S. 568,
57 S. Ct. 31 (1936).
HThis would seem to be covered by§ 167 (a) (3).
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B. The Taxability of Proceeds of Life Insurance and Endowment
Contracts as Income
I. In General
It has always been the policy of the federal income tax statute to
exempt the proceeds of life insurance policies from the provisions of
the income tax statute where they are paid by reason of the death of
the insured. Section 22 (b) 55 provides for such exemption as follows:
"The following items shall not be inclµded in gross income
and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter:
" (I) Life insurance.-Amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of the insured,
whether in a single sum or otherwise (but if such amounts are
held by the insurer under an agreement to pay interest thereon,
the interest payments shall be included in gross income) ...."
Under the present regulations, 56 this exemption is applicable to
corporate 57 as well as individual beneficiaries and is applicable even
where the proceeds are payable to the estate.58 It is inapplicable, however, when the proceeds are paid to a transferee of the policy who paid
a valuable consideration therefor. 59 It is clear, therefore, that the
normal unfunded life insurance trust involves few income tax problems,
the policies constituting the only assets of the trust, and the proceeds
being exempted as income to the trust. After the collection of the proceeds, of course, the .trust becomes an ordinary trust of personalty, and
the income therefrom is taxable to the trust or to the beneficiary as the
case may be.60
2. Instalment Payments
It would be an unusual insurance trust which provided that the
proceeds of the policies should be paid to the trustee in instalments
rather than a lump sum, since the purpose of the trust is to provide for
a flexible distribution of the proceeds to the beneficiaries, and a lump
sum payment to the trustee is usually contemplated. No case appears to
55

I. ·R. C. (1939). At least since 1918, this exemption has been present in the
statute. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213 (b) (1), 40 Stat. L. 1065.
56
Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22 (b) (1)-1 (1939); Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (b)
(1)-1 (1940).
57
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (b) (1)-1 (1940). See United States v. SuppleeBiddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 44 S. Ct. 546 (1924).
58
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (b) (1)-1 (1940).
59 Id.
60 I. R. C. (1939), §§ 161-165, and discussion in PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION, THIRD SERIES 171-174 (1940).
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have arisen where such instalment payments were made to a trustee
under a life insurance trust, although they have arisen where the
policy provides for periodic instalment payments from the insurance company directly to a beneficiary. Are these sums, or any part
thereof, taxable income? The difficulty arises because of the distinction drawn in the statute 61 between amounts "paid by reason
of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or otherwise" and
interest payments on amounts "held by the insurer under an agreement
to pay interest thereon," the former being exempt, the latter includable
in the gross income. The present statute is a result of a series of
changes,62 and it was originally the practice of the commissioner to
exempt the instalment payments in full. 68 A case arose,6 4 however, in
which the board held taxable certain payments made by an insurance
company to the beneficiary under an insurance contract in which the
insured had provided that the insurance company should retain the
proceeds. The commissioner thereupon construed the statute 65 as
meaning to exclude only the sum which would be payable in a lump
sum upon the death of the insured, regardless of the fact that the insurance contract itself calls for payment of the full sum covered by the
instalment payments. Under this interpretation the commissioner has
attempted to tax all proceeds which exceeded the commuted value of
the policies at the date of insured's death.66 Such an interpretation has
been refused by the courts in the cases which have come before them/1
the cases resting on the words of the statute and the legislative history
of the taxing statute.68 The courts are ready, however, to include in
gross income any payments by the insurance company which are really
made by the insurance company as interest in return for the use of the
proceeds left with them. 69
•

3. Endowment Contracts
It is likewise not customary for an endowment contract to be made
the subject of an insurance trust. It is entirely possible, however,1° and
61

I. R. C. (1939), § 22 (b) (1).
See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES 359 (1940).
68
Id. 362.
64
Edith M. Kinnear, 20 B. T. A. 718 ( 1930).
65
G. C. M. 13796, 13-2 CuM. BuLL. 41 (1934).
66
Commissioner v. Winslow, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 418.
6
1ld.; Commissioner v. Bartlett, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 766.
68
The opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals in Sidney W. Winslow, 39 B. T. A.
373 (1939), gives a good account of the legislative history of this exemption. ·
69
United States v. Heilbroner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) IOO F. (2d) 379.
1
° Cf. Heffelfinger v. Commissoner, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 991.
62
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since the proceeds of an endowment contract are not entirely exempted
as income,71 it may be well to determine their taxable status.
The Supreme Court has held 72 and the statute 78 provides that if an
insured survives the endowment period, the excess of the proceeds over
the total aggregate consideration paid is taxable income. It is ordinary
income and not capital gain.74 The insurance contract may, however,
contain both endowment features and insurance features, whereby, in
case the insured dies before the expiration of the endowment period,
the named beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds. If the insured does
die before the expiration of the endowment period, the proceeds are
then "paid by reason of the death of the insured" 75 and are exempt. It
appears to follow, then, that if an endowment contract were placed in
an insurance trust, and the insured survived the endowment period, the
excess proceeds over the total cost of the endowment contract would
be treated as taxable income. This income would be taxable to the
grantor if he were taxable on the income of the trust,76 or to the trustee
or to the beneficiary, depending upon the provisions in the trust instrument.
The perplexing problems raised in the income tax field by annuities
of various sorts are not discussed because this type of policy is hardly
usable in an insurance trust. 77 Likewise omitted are the problems which
arise when the proceeds of insurance, taken out by a corporation or
other business enterprise upon the life an officer or employee, are distributed to the stockholders of the corporation.78

II
THE EsTATE TAX

The creation of a life insurance trust, revocable or irrevocable,
funded or unfunded, will involve many possible impacts with the federal estate tax provisions, and a thorough understanding of the present
place of life insurance proceeds under that tax is necessary if the trust
is to serve the grantor in minimizing his taxes. Of course, the normal
insurance trust involves insurance which, upon the death of the insured,
71

I. R. C. (1939), § 22 (b) (2).

72

Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 49 S. Ct. 426 (1929).

78

I. R. C. (1939), § 22 (b) (2).

74

Avery v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) II I F. (2d) 19.
s Estate of William G. Thompson, 41 B. T. A. 901 (1940).
76
I. R. C. (1939), §§ 166, 167.
77 The question of the income tax status of annuity payments is extensively treated
in PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES 369-403 (1940).
78
See Cummings v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 1st, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 477, and
Golden v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, .1940) 113 F. (2d) 590.
7
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is payable to a beneficiary other than the estate of the insured, and
hence the decedent's estate is entitled to a $40,000 deduction from the
gross estate 79 in addition to the $40,000 specific exemption provided
for in the estate tax. 80 (This statement is subject to qualification if the
trust instrument provides that the proceeds shall, in whole or in part,
be used for expenses of administration of the estate. More will be said
of this later.) Our problem is once more to determine the present
status of the insurance trusts, the possible tax savings, and, incidentally,
the possible changes to be expected in the taxing statute.
The present statute 81 dealing specifically with life insurance proceeds has been unchanged since its original enactment in 1918.82 It is
brief, but it has been charged that its "misleading simplicity" 88 is responsible for the perplexing problems which have arisen and the numerous shifts in interpretation which have been witnessed during the
course of years. It reads:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the United States.•.•
"(g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor
as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent on his own
life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies
taken out by the decedent upon his own life."

A. Constitutionality as Applied to Insurance Trusts
The discussion here will be confined to policies whose proceeds are
received by beneficiaries other than the decedent's estate}14 As might
be expected, taxpayers who first felt the impact of the act charged that
it violated the Fifth Amendment in that there was really no transfer
from the decedent which could be the legitimate subject of a transfer
79

I. R. C. (1939), § Su (g).
This specific exemption, of course, varies with the date of decedent's death,
and in computing the basic estate tax and the additional estate taxes. See, generally,
Treas. Reg. So, arts. 1-7 (1937).
8
11. R. C. (1939), § 8II (g). This should not be taken to imply that this is
the only section under which insurance may be taxed. See, e.g., Estate of Mary
Hughes, 44 B. T. A., No. 184 (1941), where an annuity was held taxable as a gift
to take effect at death.
82
Originally Revenue Act of 1918, § 402 (f), 40 Stat. L. 1098. It appears as
§ 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1924 and subsequent acts.
88 Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARv. L. REv. 1037
(1939).
84 As to insurance "receivable by the executor," see infra, pp. 228-231.
80
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tax. Today the constitutionality of this provision is settled, even as
applied to policies which are payable to beneficiaries other than the
estate, at least if the decedent retained any incidents of ownership.
The Supreme Court in Lewellyn v. Frick 85 was called upon to pass
upon the applicability of the r 9 I 8 act to policies taken out before the
act was passed, and which had also been assigned by the insured before
the act was passed. Some of the policies had been irrevocably assigned,
while in others there was retained a power to revoke the assignment
which was not exercised. Without drawing any distinction between the
two types of policies, the Court ruled that the act was to be construed
to avoid any question of constitutionality, and in order to reach that
end, held that the proceeds of the policies were not to be included in
the gross estate. They did not pass directly on the issue of whether
there was really a transfer< of anything at the death of the decedent
which could properly be made the subject of the tax. Subsequent cases 86
have largely limited the effects of the Frick case, indicating that it is
only when all incidents of ownership were irrevocably disposed of
before I 9 I 8 that the act will not be retroactively applied, but it is not
entirely certain that the case is actually so limited.87
In Chase National Bank v. United States, 88 the policies were procured after the I 9 I 8 Revenue Act, and the insured retained a power
to change the beneficiary, which power was never exercised. The Court
there upheld the 1921 act against objections that nothing was transferred because the interests of the beneficiaries "vested" prior to death;
that the tax was a direct tax on the property; and that the measure of
the tax was so arbitrary as to violate the Fifth Amendment. The Court
said: 89
". . . But until the moment of death the decedent retained a
legal interest in the policies which gave him the power of disposi268 U. S. 238, 45 S. Ct. 487 (1925).
Heiner v. Grandin, (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) 44 F. (2d) 141, affd. Grandin v.
Heiner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1932) 56 F. (2d) 1082, cert. den. 286 U. S. 561, 52 S. Ct.
643 (1932); Cook v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 995, cert. den.
291 U. S. 660, 54 S. Ct. 3771 (1933); Newman v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 5th,
1935) 76 F. (2d) 449, cert. den. 296 U. S. 600, 56 S. Ct. II6 (1935); Mimnaugh
v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 4II (1928), cert. den. 280 U. S. 563, 50 S. Ct. 24
(1929); Scott v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 444. But see Wyeth
v. Crooks, (D. C. Mo. 1928) 33 F. (2d) 1018.
87
See Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 2II, 56 S. Ct. 180 (1936), and
Industrial Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 200, 56 S. Ct. 182 (1936), and
the discussion in Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L.
REv. 1037 at 1043-1046 (1939).
88
278 U.S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929).
89
278 U. S. at 334.
85

86
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tion of them and their proceeds as completely as if he were himself the beneficiary of them. The precise question presented is
whether the termination at death of that power and the consequent passing to the designated beneficiaries of all rights under
the policies freed of the possibility of its exercise may be the
legitimate subject of a transfer tax, as is true of the termination
by death of any of the other legal incidents of property through
which its use or economic enjoyment may be controlled."
Then, relying on a decision 90 holding that the remainder interest in a
trust subject to a power of disposition in the grantor was properly subjected to a succession tax, the Court said: 91
" . . . Such an outstanding power residing exclusively in a
donor to recall a gift after it is made is a limitation on the gift
which makes it incomplete as to the donor as well as to the donee,
and we think that the termination of such a power at death may
also be the appropriate subject of a tax upon transfers."
In the remainder of the opinion the Court dismissed as having no merit
the arguments that the "transfer" came from the insurance company
and not the insured, and that the method of computing the transfer tax
was violative of due process.92
This case clearly appears to rest its decision regarding the constitutionality of the taxing provision upon the fact that the decedent
insured had at the time of his death some incident of ownership which
was thereby extinguished. The Court mentions in addition to the power
to change beneficiaries, the power to surrender and cancel the policies,
to pledge them as security for loans and the power to dispose of them
and their proceeds for his own benefit during his life which subjects
them to the control of a bankruptcy court for the benefit of his creditors.
A brief summary of the changes in the administrative regulations
is necessary at this point to determine the constitutional problems which
exist at the present time, for, although the language of the statute
has remained unchanged, the administrative interpretations have been
frequently revised. The statute provides that in order to be ta..xable
90

Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225 (1928).
278 U. S. at 336-337.
92
"As it is the termination of the power of disposition of the policies by the
decedent at death which operates as an effective transfer and is subjected to the tax,
there can be no objection to measuring the tax or fixing its rate by including in the
gross estate the value of the policies at the time of death, together with all the other
interests of decedent transferred at his death." 278 U. S. at 339.
91
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the insurance must be "taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
It is with the meaning of this phrase that the administrative body has
been concerned. The earliest regulations provided that insurance was
"taken out by the decedent upon his own life" if he "pays the premiums,
either directly or indirectly, whether or not he makes the application." 98 Before the decision in the Chase National Bank case, the regulations provided for the inclusion of all insurance in excess of $40,000
receivable by beneficiaries other than the estate "irrespective of the
retention of such legal incidents of ownership." 94 This latter provision
was eliminated in 1930,95 shortly after the Chase National Bank decision. The 1934 regulations provided that "Insurance is considered to
be taken out by the decedent in all cases, whether or not he makes the
application, if he pays the premiums, either directly or indirectly, or
they are paid by a person other than the beneficiary, or decedent possesses any of the legal incidents of ownership ...." 96 They thus provided three tests of determining whether a policy was "taken out by the
insured"-payment of premiums by the insured, payment of premiums
by one other than the beneficiary, and the retention of legal incidents
of ownership by the decedent.97 Administrative practice during the
time, however, was to include only the proceeds of policies in which
decedent retained the legal incidents of ownership.98 In 1937, this
practice was embodied in the regulations,99 apparently upon the authority of the Chase National Bank case,100 and until recently the sole test of
93

Treas. Reg. 37, art. 32 (1921); Treas. Reg. 63, art. 27 (1922); Treas.
Reg. 68, art. 25 (1924); Treas. Reg. 70, art. 25 (1929).
94
Treas. Reg. 70, art. 27 (1929).
95
T. D. 4296, 9-2 CuM. BuLL. 427 (1930).
96
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25 (1934).
91 See Fraenkel, "Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Policies," 5 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 140 (1936).
98 There has always been the possibility of including the proceeds of insurance
policies under some other section of the statute. Thus, after some wavering, it now
seems likely that a policy transferred in' contemplation of death would be taxable under
the provisions of§ 8II (c), I. R. C. (1939). See G. C. M. 16932, 15-2 CUM, BULL,
299 (1936), partially revoking G. C. M. n64, 6-1 CuM. BuLL. 315 (1927); May
Billings, 35 B. T. A. II47 (1937). See generally, Oppenheimer, ''Proceeds of Life
Insurance Policies under the Federal Estate Tax," 43 HARv. L. REv. 724 (1930).
99
T. D. 4729, 16-1 CuM. BULL, 284 at 288 (1937). Art. 25 of Treas. Reg.
80 (1937) reads: "Insurance is considered to have been taken out by the decedent,
whether or not he made the application, if he acquired the ownership of, or any
legal incident thereof in, the policy•••." It was also provided that the old regulations,
Treas. Reg. 70, art. 25 (1929), would apply to decedents dying before November 7,
1934.
100 There is marked similarity between the language in the Chase National Bank
case and the language in art. 25, Treas. Reg. 80 (1937).
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determining whether insurance was "taken out by the decedent" was
the test of retention of legal incidents of ownership.101 But today the
administrative regulations have completed the cycle 102 and are back
to the test of payment of premiums as being decisive on the question
whether the policies are "taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
Article 2 7 of the Treasury Regulations, as a result of the recent amendment, reads as follows:
"The amount in excess of $40,000 of the aggregate proceeds
of all insurance on the decedent's life not receivable by or for
the benefit of his estate must be included in his gross estate as
follows:
"(r) To the extent to which such insurance was taken out by
the decedent upon his own life (see article 25) after January ro,
r94r, the date of Treasury Decision 5032, and
"(2) To the extent to which such insurance was taken out by
the decedent upon his own life ( see article 2 5) on or before J anuary ro, r 94r, and with respect to which the decedent possessed
any of the legal incidents of ownership at any time after such date
or, in the case of a decedent dying on or before such date, at the
time of his death."
Article 25 of the Treasury Regulations, also amended by T. D.
5032, now reads:
"The term 'insurance' refers to life insurance of every description, including death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies
operating under the lodge system. Insurance receivable by beneficiaries other than the estate is considered to have been taken out
by the decedent where he paid, either directly or indirectly, all
the premiums or other consideration wherewith the insurance
was acquired, whether or not he made the application. Such insurance is not considered to have been so taken out, even though
the application was made by the decedent, if no part of the premiums or other consideration was paid either directly or indirectly
by him. Where a portion of the premiums or other consideration
was actually paid by another and the remaining portion by the decedent, either directly or indirectly, such insurance is considered
101

See Anna Rosenstock, 41 B. T. A. 635 (1940); Levy's Estate v. Commissioner,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 412; Ballard v. Helburn, (D. C. Ky. 1933) 9
F. Supp. 812, a:ffd. Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 613;
McKelvy v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 395. But see Bailey v.
United States, (Ct. CI. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617, modified in 30 F. Supp. 184, new
trial granted, 31 F. Supp. 778.
102
T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REv. BuLL. 13.
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to have been taken out by the latter in the proportion that the payments therefor made by him bear to the total amount paid for the
insurance."
As a matter of construction, the language of the statute is broad
enough to support this administrative regulation, and to make the
proceeds of all policies, regardless of retention of incidents of ownership, subject to the tax. As said in a very recent decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: 103 ·
"The language of section 302 (g) 104 is of the broadest kind.
It in terms includes in the gross estate of a decedent amounts
receivable by all other beneficiaries. Only because of the regulations and certain judicial decisions has section 302 (g) not been
extended to cases where the insured has retained no interest in a
policy taken out on his own life. As an original question, even
such a policy might have been thought to fall within section 302
(g) because of its inherent testamentary character."
While this language was pure dictum ( the ultimate decision was based
upon the fact that the decedent had retained a possibility of reverter
in case the beneficiary predeceased him and the proceeds were thus includable under the decision in Helvering v. Hallock 105 ) it nevertheless
indicates that the court regarded insurance as inherently testamentary.
Similar expressions may be found in the original opinion in the Bailey
case.1os
It is upon this basis that the new regulations attempt to impose the
tax upon insurance proceeds regardless of retention of legal incidents
of ownership. It seems clear that this attempt is a "stark, unadorned
amendment of the law." 107 And it is to be noted that the commissioner
has carefully refrained from giving the new regulations any retroactive
effect.108 Under the doctrine which the Supreme Court announced in
Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Company,100 it is doubtful whether any
108
Chase Nat. Bank of the City of New York v. United States, (C. C. A.
2d, 1940) u6 F. (2d) 625 at 627.
104
Sec. 302 (g) of the 1926 Revenue Act, 44 Stat. L. 71, which is identical with
§ 8II (g), I. R. C. (1939).
105
309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
106
Bailey v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617.
107
Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REV. 1037
at 1049 (1939).
108
Treas. Reg. So, art. 27 (2) (1937), as amended by T. D. 5032, 1941-3
INT. REV. BULL. 13.
109
306 U.S. IIO, 59 S. Ct. 423 (1939).
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such retroactive effect could be given.110 It is also to be noted that only
the proportion of the proceeds allocable to premiums paid by the
insured are included, a limitation which will aid in saving the constitutionality of the new regulations.
Nevertheless, this constitutional question must now be answered:
Can Congress levy a transfer tax upon the proceeds of life insurance
policies, regardless of whether the decedent possessed any legal incidents of ownership in the policies, merely because the decedent had
paid the premiums upon such policies?
Insurance is a unique type of property inasmuch as economic benefits accrue to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured in a larger
measure than he theretofore had held. In that respect it is closely
analogous to the taxation of joint tenancies and property in which the
deceased made an inter vivas transfer of a remainder, retaining in himself a life interest. Both of these latter have been held constitutionally
includable in the gross estate. While there are some cases 111 which
indicate that payment of premiums alone is not sufficient to justify the
inclusion of the proceeds of insurance policies in the absence of retaining some other legal incidents of ownership, it appears entirely probable
that the Supreme Court, when called upon to do so, will uphold the
constitutionality of the new regulations, at least in so far as they are
prospectively applied, and in so far as they include in the gross estate
only the proceeds allocable to premiums paid by the decedent.112 The
case would be somewhat more doubtful, however, if an attempt were
made to include the proceeds of policies of insurance which had been
applied for by another and on which all premiums had been paid by
another, in which the decedent never had held any interest. Thus, if
a wife of a decedent, who has a sufficient insurable interest to permit
her to do so, should apply for insurance upon her husband's life and pay
all the premiums on the insurance, it might be difficult to find a basis
110 The Court there announced that the re-enactment of a statute without alteration will be held to mean that Congressional approval is given to the administrative
construction, and thereby give such construction "the force of law."
111
Levy's Estate v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 412 at
415, in which the court said: "The fact that the insured continued to pay premiums
after the applicable Revenue Acts were passed, does not affect the result [ excluding
the proceeds from the gross estate]." Also Anna Rosenstock, 41 B. T. A. 635 (1940),
holding that proceeds of policies were to be excluded from the gross estate of the
insured because they had been orally assigned by the insured to his wife, even though
the premiums were paid thereafter from funds from a partnership composed of the
insured and the wife-beneficiary.
112
See an able discussion in Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax,"
52 HARV. L. REv. 1037 at 1052-1056 (1939).
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for including the proceeds of such a policy in the husband's estate.
Much the same arguments could be made as to the proportion of the
proceeds allocable to premiums actually paid by the beneficiary of a
policy, even though the decedent had paid part of the premiums. It is
not inconceivable, however, that even under these circumstances, inclusion of the proceeds would be held constitutionally permissible.

B. Problems of Interpretation
Problems of constitutionality aside, at the present time there are
three possibilities as to the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the
gross estate of a decedent: (r) they may be included in the full
amount; (2) they may be included to the extent that they exceed
$40,000; (3) they may be entirely excluded from the gross estate of
the insured. Any of these possibilities may occur in the following situations.
Taxability of Proceeds of Policies Payable to Executors
Insurance proceeds are to be included in the full amount under
the present statute "to the extent of the amount receivable by the
executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life...." 113 In addition to the determination of whether the
insurance is "taken out by the decedent upon his own life," 114 it is
also necessary to determine the meaning of the phrase "receivable by
the executor." Although nominally all insurance held in an insurance
trust is payable to a named trustee and not to the estate or the executor,
there are nevertheless instances where the insurance proceeds are includable in full without benefit of the $40,000 exemption.
The regulations 115 at present provide:
I.

"The statute requires the inclusion in the gross estate of all
insurance receivable by the executor or administrator or payable
to the decedent's estate, and all insurance which is in fact receivable by, or for the benefit of, the estate. It includes insurance
effected to provide funds to meet the estate tax, and any other
taxes, debts, or charges which are enforceable against the estate.
The manner in which the policy is drawn is immaterial so long as
there is an obligation, legally binding upon the beneficiary, to
use the proceeds in payment of such taxes, debts or charges. The
118

Sec. 811 (g), I. R. C. (1939).
See discussion supra, pp. 212-215.
115
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 26 (1937), as amended by T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT.
REV. BULL. 14.
114
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full amount of the proceeds so receivable, without the benefit of
any exemption, forms a part of the gross estate, though all the
premiums or other consideration wherewith the insurance was
acquired may have been paid by a person other than the decedent.
If the decedent procured insurance in favor of another person or
corporation as collateral security for a loan or other accommodation, the insurance is considered to be receivable for the benefit of
the estate. The amount of the loan outstanding at decedent's
death will be deductible in determining the net estate, and the
interest thereon will be deductible in accordance with the provisions of article 36."
There are several points to be noted in connection with these regulations as they affect life insurance trusts. First of all, in determining
whether the insurance is "receivable by the executor" the payment of
premiums is immaterial.116 Thus, even in a funded, irrevocable trust,
if the proceeds were subjected to the payment of debts of the estate
or taxes thereon, the proceeds would to that extent be includable. Of
course the payment of premiums will be important, as shown above,
in determining whether the insurance was "taken out by the decedent
upon his own life."
Second, since one of the primary functions of the life insurance trust,
funded or unfunded, is to provide ready assets "for the payment of
death taxes and other probate estate obligations, and thus avoid estate
shrinkage through forced liquidation of non-liquid estate assets," 117
it is apparent that the trust instrument must be carefully drawn to prevent the loss of the $40,000 exemption and yet enable the trustee to
fulfill this function. As indicated by the regulations,118 the $40,000
exemption is not lost unless there is a mandatory duty upon the trustee
to use the insurance proceeds for the payment of expenses of administration or debts of the estate. Three methods have been suggested 110
for reaching this result: (I) limiting the trustee to the proceeds of
particular policies for such purposes; (2) making the power to use the
proceeds for estate purposes discretionary with the trustee; and (3)
116

This is the principal change effected by the 1941 amendment (T. D. 5032)
of the 1937 regulations.
117
Tye, "Federal Taxation of Life Insurance," 18 T AXEs 79 ( I 940).
118
"The manner in which the policy is drawn is immaterial so long as there is
an obligation, legally binding upon the beneficiary, to use the proceeds in payment of
such taxes, debts or charges." (Italics supplied.) Art. 26, Treas. Reg. 80 (1937), as
amended byT. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REV. BULL. 14.
119
Tye, "Federal Taxation of Life Insurance," 18 TAXES 79 (1940).
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permitting the trustee to purchase assets from the estate at their assessed value or their fair market value.120
If the first course is followed, then the $40,000 exemption could
be used on all other policies.121 The second method ( which appears to
be the most dangerous since the instrument might be construed to
create a mandatory duty) has received the approval of the Board of
Tax Appeals. In Old Colony Trust Company, Executor,122 the trust
instrument provided, in addition to granting permission to the trustee
to purchase any property in the estate, that the trustee was authorized
"To use and apply the principal and accumulated income of the trust
estate to such extent as it may deem necessary for the payment of any
debt of the Donor or for taxes, however denominated, which may be
or become due or be payable from the estate of the Donor...." The
commissioner refused to permit a deduction of $40,000 from the
amount of the proceeds, but the board reversed his ruling, declaring
that, because the power was purely discretionary with.the trustee and
he was under no legal obligation to pay such debts, taxes, or expenses,
the insurance was not "receivable by the executor." To the extent that
proceeds were used under a discretionary power to meet obligations
of the estate, they would be included in the estate without benefit of
the exemption, but the exemption is allowable against the remainder
of the policies.128
The third method would almost certainly be without the statute,
and the $40,000 exemption should still be available.
If the trust indenture actually subjects the proceeds of policies,
even though not otherwise includable in his estate, to payment of expenses of his last illness and burial, the proceeds are to that extent includable in a decedent's estate.124
If the insurance is payable to a nominal trustee, who is also executor
under the will, and the proceeds are mingled with the assets of the
estate and used in the payment of the expenses, such proceeds are includable.120 Or, conversely, if the insurance is payable to the estate,
even though a tru~t be declared in the will specifically including the
policies, and even though the proceeds are not actually used for the
120 This method is also suggested in Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate
Tax," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1037 at 1058 (1939).
121 Cf. Estate of Waldo Rohnert, 40 B. T. A. 1319 (1939).
122
39 B. T. A. 871 (1939).
128 Estate of Waldo Rohnert, 40 B. T. A. 1319 (1939).
124 Pacific Nat. Bank of Seattle, Exr., 40 B. T. A. 128 (1939).
125 Marmaduke B. Morton, Admr., 23 B. T. A. 236 (1931).
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estate expenses, the proceeds are includable.126 On the other hand, it
has been held on very similar facts that if insurance is payable to a
named trustee, who is also executor under the will, and no beneficiaries
are named but the terms of the will provide for a trust of all "property
over which I may have any power of disposition," the exemption of
$40,000 is to be allowed.121 These last two cases can be reconciled only
on the technical grounds that in the first case the proceeds were payable
to the estate, and in the second they were payable to a trustee who was
also executor under the will.
The final point to be noted concerns policies which have been
pledged by the insured as collateral for a personal obligation. It is
possible that such a policy may be placed in an insurance trust.128 In
such a case, particularly if the pledgee should enforce his rights against
the proceeds, it would seem likely that such proceeds would constitute
a part of decedent's gross estate. Likewise, if the trust agreement
directed the trustee to satisfy any obligation of the insured, to that
extent the proceeds would be included in the gross estate.129

Taxability of Proceeds of Policies Reserving Incidents
of Ownership to Insured
(a) In General
Apart from the situations noted in the preceding sections, the
proceeds of insurance policies placed in an insurance trust, if included
in the gross estate at all, will be given an exemption of $40,000. Our
problem here is to determine the ·circumstances under which the proceeds will be included and the circumstances under which they will be
excluded.
Under the new regulations,1110 if insurance is procured after Janu2.

120 First Nat. Bank of Memphis, Exr., 41 B. T. A. 1299 (1940). See also John
Bromley, Exr., 16 B. T. A. 1322 (1929) (insurance payable nominally to executors,
but a showing that decedent's husband had paid all the premiums).
127
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 1st, 1938) 100
F. (2d) 266, reversing 37 B. T. A. 66 (1938). Compare Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (D. C. Pa. 1927) 24 F. (2d) 459.
128
Frederick H. Frazier, 41 B. T. A. 146 (1940) (an income tax case).
129
Mathilde B. Hooper, Admx., 41 B. T. A. 114 (1940); Treas. Reg. 80,
art. 26 (1937), as amended by T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REv. BuLL. 14. Note, of
course, that the amount of the debt would be deductible from the gross estate in determining the net taxable estate. For a discussion of the probable inclusion of proceeds
of policies taken out directly by the creditors as collateral security for loans, see Paul,
"Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1037 at 1059-1060
(1939).
lSO T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REV. BULL. 15.
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ary ro, 1941, then the payment of premiums by the insured will be
sufficient to justify the inclusion of the proceeds in his gross estate, and
nothing else need be considered. If this regulation be constitutional,181
it is clear that the unfunded trust, as normally used, can never result in
complete exclusion of the proceeds of the policies from the gross estate,
since it is always contemplated that the insured will continue to pay
premiums during his life. It may be, too, that the proceeds of policies
in a funded trust would be covered by the present regulations. It has
been pointed out that the income of a funded insurance trust ( at least
to the extent necessary to pay the premiums on the policies) is regarded
as that of the grantor for the purposes of income taxation.1112 An argument might be made, therefore, that the grantor "paid the premiums"
for the purpose of establishing liability for the estate tax. There is no
authority on this point, however, and a contrary result is possible.
As to insurance procured before January ro, 1941, it is possible that
the insurance proceeds of an insurance trust will not be included in the
gross estate. Section (2) of article 27, Treasury Regulations 80 183
now provides:
"The amount in excess of $40,000 of the aggregate proceeds
of all insurance on the decedent's life not receivable by or for
the benefit of his estate must be included in his gross estate as
follows: ...
"(2) To the extent to which such insurance was taken out
by the decedent upon his own life ( see article 2 5) on or before
January ro, 1941, and with respect to which the decedent possessed any of the legal incidents of ownership 1114 at any time after
such date, or, in the case of a decedent dying on or before such
date, at the time of his death."
It thus appears that insurance proceeds will be included only if
they are "taken out by the decedent upon his own life," 135 and he
possessed legal incidents of ownership after the date mentioned or at
the date of his death. The question thus becomes one of determining
131

See discussion, supra, pp. 221-228.
Sec. 167 (a) (3), I. R. C. (1939); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 53 S. Ct.
761 (1933); DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685, 53 S. Ct. 766 (1933). But
see First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, Exrs., 36 B. T. A. 651 (1937).
183 As amended by T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REV. BuLL. 15.
184 The regulations list several examples of incidents of ownership. See infra,
note 137.
185 See discussion as to the meaning of this phrase, supra, pp. 212-215.
132
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what are the legal incidents of ownership in a life insurance policy.186
Clearly the incidents of ownership named in the regulations 187 are
sufficient to justify the inclusion in the gross estate. The power to
change beneficiaries,138 the power to surrender the policy or borrow
upon it,139 the power to revoke the trust 140 or the assignment of the
policy,m are all sufficient incidents of ownership to render the proceeds includable in the gross estate. A complete power of revocation,
or a power to withdraw the policies from the trust would probably
render the proceeds includable. Some of the other "incidents of ownership" require more elaborate treatment.

(b) Effect of Possibility of Reverter
It is a not uncommon provision in life insurance policies that the
proceeds shall revert to the estate of the insured in case the beneficiaries shall predecease him, which appears to be the equivalent of
the "possibility of reverter" in an ordinary trust. Prior to 1937, the
regulations provided that "The decedent possesses a legal incident
of ownership if the rights of the beneficiaries to receive the proceeds are
conditioned upon the beneficiaries surviving the decedent." 142 The
Treasury Department apparently decided against such a construction
136

It is believed that in order to determine what powers are reserved by the
grantor both the policy and the terms of the trust should be examined. Thus, a trust
agreement might be drawn, made irrevocable by its express terms, and the policies
made payable to the trustee. Yet, if the policies themselves reserved to the insured the
right to change beneficiaries or to surrender the policies for cash, the irrevocable trust
would be a "shell without a kernel." It has been held in such a case that the transfer
was not sufficiently complete to prevent the imposition of an estate tax. Old Point
Nat. Bank, Exr., 39 B. T. A. 343 (1939).
187
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 27 (1937), amended by T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT.
REV. BuLL. 15, lists the following: "Legal incidents of ownership in the policy include, for example, the right of the insured or his estate to its economic benefits, the
power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the pqlicy, to assign it, to revoke
an assignment, to pledge it for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against
the surrender value of the policy, etc."
138
Newman v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 449; Cook v.
Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 995; Chase Nat. Bank v. United
States, 278 U.S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929); Levy's Estate v. Commissioner, (C. C. A.
2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 412; Sampson v. United States, (D. C. Mass. 1932) 1 F.
Supp. 95.
189
Sampson v. United States, (D. C. Mass. 1932) l F. Supp. 95; Ballard v.
Helburn, (D. C. Ky. 1933) 9 F. Supp. 812, affd. Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A.
6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 613.
140
Helvering v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 56 S. Ct. 70
(1935) (even though the power to revoke was held jointly with a beneficiary).
141 Bessie M. Ballinger, Ex'x, 23 B. T. A. 1312 (1931).
142 Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25 (1934).
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and deleted that provision in March, 1937.143 At the present time,
however, it seems fairly certain that a provision that the proceeds are
to revert to the insured in case of the prior death of the beneficiary is
sufficient to render the proceeds includable in the estate. The Supreme
Court, in Helvering v. Hallock 144 (a case not involving insurance)
held that the value of the corpus of a trust should be included in the
grantor's gross estate because the trust provided that it was to revert
to the grantor in case the beneficiary predeceased the grantor. Prior
to that decision there had been a number of decisions to the effect that
such a provision in an insurance policy was not sufficient to make the
proceeds includable.145 Since that time, however, the Circuit Courts
of Appeals for the First Circuit 146 and for the Second Circuit 147 as well
as the Court of Claims 148 have all held that the decision in the Hallock
case is applicable to such a provision in an insurance policy. A seemingly contrary decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 149 will probably
not be followed, and the regulations now specifically provide that such
an interest is an "incident of ownership." 150

(c) Effect of Power to Alter Beneficial Interests in the Trust
Even though the policies be irrevocably assigned or made payable
to the trustee-beneficiary, it seems likely that if the grantor of the trust
retains the power in the trust instrument to alter the interests of the
beneficiaries, even though he expressly excludes the possibility of making himself the beneficiary, the proceeds will be included in his gross
estate. There seem to be no decisions on the precise point, but such a
148

T. D. 4729, 16-1 CuM. BuLL. 284 at 289 (1937).
309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940). See also the companion cases, Rothensies
v. Huston and Bryant v. Helvering, decided at the same time and by the same opinion,
and Estate of John S. Conant, 41 B. T. A. 739 (1940).
145
Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211, 56 S. Ct. 180 (1935); Industrial
Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U.S. 220, 56 S. Ct. 182 (1935); Helvering v. Parker,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 838; Walker v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1936)
83 F. (2d) 103; Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 613; Thomas
C. Boswell, 37 B. T. A. 970 (1938).
146
Broderick v. Keefe, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 293, appeal dismissed
Keefe v. Broderick, 3II U.S. 721, 60 S. Ct. II07 (1940).
147
Chase Nat. Bank of the City of New York v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) 116 F. (2d) 625.
148
Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778.
49
~
Estate of William G. Thompson, 41 B. T. A. 901 (1940).
150
Treas. Reg. So, art. 27 (1937), as amended by T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT.
REV. BULL. 15.
H
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power in a trust not including insurance has been held sufficient 151 and
it would seem to be just as effective control on the part of the insured
as a power to change the beneficiary of the policy.152

(d) Effect of the Payment of Premiums
It has already been noted that the continued payment of premiums
by the insured after divesting himself of all other "incidents of ownership" will be enough, under the new regulations, to render the proceeds of all insurance taken out after January ro, r94r, includable in
the gross estate. 153 Still unanswered, however, is the question: If an
insured has taken out insurance prior to January ro, r94r, and divested himself of all other incidents of ownership, will the fact that he
pays premiums thereon after January ro, r94r, make the proceeds
includable in the gross estate? There have been cases which point to a
negative answer. Thus, in Levy's Estate v. Commissioner 154 the court
excluded from decedent's gross estate the value of an annuity which his
wife was to receive from the proceeds of certain policies of life insurance, because the deceased-insured had irrevocably designated the wife
as beneficiary of such annuity. The case is distinguishable, however,
since the irrevocable designation had been made in May, r9r6, prior to
the enactment of the estate tax. The court said,155 "The fact that the
insured continued to pay premiums after the applicable Revenue Acts
were passed, does not affect the result. To the extent of this annuity
only the order should be modified, for it may not be taxed." So, too, in
a recent case before the Board of Tax Appeals 156 the board excluded
the proceeds of policies which had been orally assigned by the insured
to his wife, even though the premiums had been paid by funds from a
partnership composed of the insured and the wife-beneficiary. This
holding was entered despite the fact that the policies retained to the
insured the right to change beneficiaries, the board ruling that the oral
assignment was sufficient to transfer all legal incidents of ownership and
divest the insured of such right to change beneficiaries.
151
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933); In re Tyler's
Estate, (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 421. For the effect of this holding on the
gift tax problem, see Sanford's Estate v. United States, 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51
(1939), Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939), and discussion,
infra, p. 246.
152
In which case it would be included, note 138, supra.
153
See discussion infra, pp. 231-232.
154
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 412.
155 !d. at 415.
158
Anna Rosenstock, 41 B. T. A. 635 (1940).
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But the fact remains that the modified opinion in the Bailey case 157
has this to say:
"The case was originally tried and submitted upon the proposition that the proceeds of insurance policies could not under the
provisions of sections 302 and 401 [Revenue Acts of 1926 and
1932, respectively] be included in the gross estate for the purpose
of determining the net estate subject to tax, even if the decedent had
continued after the assignments to pay the premiums. The former
opinion of the court stands as authority that this may not be
done. • .. The former opinion is modified only to the extent that
it may be regarded as holding that sections 302 and 401 require
the inclusion in the gross estate of insurance proceeds under policies
unconditionally assigned where the premiums are subsequently
paid by the beneficiary, or the person to whom assigned, from his
or her own funds."
It is apparent that under the present gift tax regulations 158 the
irrevocable transfer of a policy of insurance to an insurance trust calls
for payment of a gift tax, and each subsequent payment of premium
is a taxable gift.159 If, in addition, the proceeds are to be included in
the gross estate, the unfunded trust will lose a considerable portion
of its utility as a tax minimizer. This seems probable for insurance
trusts in the future, at any rate, in view of the amendment in the regulations which makes the payment of premiums decisive of the question
whether the policies are "taken out by the decedent."

3. Taxability of Other Property of Funded Trusts

If the insurance trust be funded, it contains property other than the
insurance policies, and an additional question arises as to whether that
property is to be included in the gross estate. Throughout the remainder of this section of the article the word "corpus" will refer only
to such other property. This question may perhaps be answered by
reference to the provisions of section 8 l l of the Internal Revenue Code
other than paragraph (g). These provisions are applicable to all transfers in trust. One cannot, however, ignore the peculiar situation occupied by the insurance trust, and the possibility of achieving a logical
and equitable correlation between the gift tax, the estate tax, and the
income tax.
157

Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184.
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (5) (1936).
159
Id., art. 2 (6).
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It is only an irrevocable transfer which offers much difficulty. The
corpus is clearly includable in the gross estate if the grantor reserves
a power to revoke,160 a power to alter beneficial interests in the trust,161
or a possibility of reverter.162 Likewise, if the transfer be made in contemplation of death 168 or intended to take effect at or after the death
of the grantor,16 ,1, or if a power of revocation be relinquished in contemplation of death,165 the value of the corpus of an insurance trust,
just as the value of the corpus of other trusts, constitutes part of the
gross estate.
But, assume that a transfer is made by way of an irrevocable funded
insurance trust. Assume further that the provisions of the trust instrument are such that if it were not for the fact that the income is to be
used to pay premiums on insurance policies, the transfer would be a
completed gift and the value of such property would not be included
in the gross estate. Does the fact that the transfer is made through an
insurance trust result in any different taxable status?
It has already been noted 166 that the income of the property will
still be regarded as that of the grantor so far as income tax liability is
concerned. It will be shown later 167 that the Supreme Court, in order
to achieve correlation between the gift tax and the income tax, has held
that an irrevocable transfer to an insurance trust does not require the
payment of a gift tax on the full value of the property transferred.
Instead, the taxpayer is permitted to deduct the capitalized value of the
income necessary to pay premiums during his life. Thus, he is regarded
as having an interest in the corpus so far as the gift tax is concerned.
It might well be argued, therefore, that as long as the taxpayer is regarded as having an interest for the purposes of the gift tax and the
income tax, he should also be regarded as having an interest for the
purposes of the estate tax. Certainly, one who transfers property ( outside of an insurance trust) but reserves a life interest will be subjected
to an estate tax on such property.168 The interest which renders the
grantor of a funded insurance trust liable for an income tax and not
liable for a gift tax appears to be closely analogous to a life interest.
160

Sec. 811 (d}, I. R. C. (1939).
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933).
162
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
168
Sec. 811 (c}, I. R. C. (1939).
164, Id.
165
Sec. 811 (d), I. R. C. (1939).
166
Supra, pp. 210-212.
187
Infra, pp. 255-256.
168
Sec. 811, I. R. C. (1939).
161
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Moreover it could hardly be argued by the decedent's estate that it
was inequitable to levy an estate tax in view of the fact that no gift tax
had been collected on the value of the interest retained by the taxpayer.
On the other hand, it is possible that this line of reasoning will prevail: the "interest" of the grantor of a funded life insurance trust which
makes him liable for tax on the income thereof is purely fictional,
designed to prevent evasion; since he must pay tax on the income it
is only equitable to permit him a deduction on the gift tax; but it is not
necessary to carry the fiction further and charge him an estate tax; the
government revenue will not be appreciably diminished if each premium
payment is regarded as a gift; 169 consequently, the inclusion of the
corpus of an insurance trust in the gross estate rests on the same basis
as the corpus of a trust not involving insurance. It is submitted that
this latter argument would serve the interests of tax uniformity better
than the rather tenuous argument outlined above which is based on the
faint hope of achieving an exact correlation between the three taxes.

4. Miscellaneous Problems of the Estate Tax
(a) Charitable Beneficiaries
Section 812 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provides
that there shall be deducted from the gross estate all bequests, legacies,
devises, or transfers which are for charitable purposes. If the grantor
of an insurance trust makes a provision for a bequest to charity from the
proceeds of the policy, this deduction, despite a contrary provision in
the regulations,110 is to be allowed in addition to the $40,000 exemption allowed on insurance payable to beneficiaries other than the estate
of the insured. In a recent case a decedent left $41,122.20 in insurance
proceeds to his daughter. Another policy of $50,000 was payable to
Columbia University. The administratrix claimed the $40,000 exemption on the insurance payable to the daughter, and a full exemption
for the insurance payable to the charitable beneficiary. The commissioner claimed that the $40,000 insurance exemption should be prorated between the two policies in proportion to their face values, which
would result in a larger tax. The Board of Tax Appeals ruled in favor
of the taxpayer 171 and was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
169
Whether this result will be attained has not yet been decided. The question
was specifically reserved in Martin Beck, 43 B. T. A., No. 23 (1940).
170
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 27 (1937).
171
Estate of Michael I. Pupin, 38 B. T. A. 1218 (1938).
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the Second Circuit.112 The latter court said the purpose of the exemption of charitable gifts was
"· .. to encourage bequests or similar transfers to charities by
by relieving the estate from tax on the bequeathed or transferred
property, quite as fully as though that property had had no existence. . . . With the property transferred to Columbia out of
the case, the daughter's insurance would take the full benefit of
the $40,000 exemption. On the other hand, the apportionment
proposed by the commissioner would make the estate pay a larger
tax than if there had been no insurance payable to Columbia, a
result never intended by Congress." 178
Since the beneficiaries of a trust, and not the trustee, are the real
recipients of the trust property,174 the rule would appear to be applicable if the insurance were placed in trust, with an outright gift to the
charitable institution.
A rather more common provision, however, is to provide that the
income from the trust shall go to a named beneficiary, with the remainder interest in the corpus to the charitable institution. In such a
case only the value of the remainder interest would be deductible.175
And, if the amount to be received by the charitable beneficiary is
indefinite ( as, e.g., if the trustee can invade the corpus during the life
beneficiary's interest, or if the power to call for parts of the principal is
given to the life beneficiary), probably no deduction will be allowed
for the charitable bequest,176 since it has an unascertainable value.

(b) Liability for the Estate Tax
The payment of the estate tax is the primary liability of the executor
or administrator of the estate of the decedent 111 and if none has been
appointed, then "all persons in actual or constructive possession of any
property of the decedent are liable for and required to pay the tax to
172

Commissioner v. Pupin's Estate, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 745.
107 F. (2d) at 746.
·
174
Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 61 S. Ct. 653 (1941); United
States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659 (1941); and Ryerson v. United States,
312 U. S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656 (1941), all decided by the Supreme Court on March
3, 1 94 1 •
m Treas. Reg. 80, art. 44 (1937); Brown v. Deputy, (D. C. Del. 1940) 30
F. Supp. 860.
176
Treas. Reg. 80, arts. 44, 47 (1937); Brown v. Deputy, (D. C. Del. 1940)
30 F. Supp. 860.
177
Sec. 305 (a), Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 74, as amended by§ 203 (a),
Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 224; § 822, I. R. C. (1939). Personal liability is
possible. See Treas. Reg. 80, art. 102 (1937).
178
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the extent of the value of such property." 178 Specific provision is made,
however, for subjecting the insurance proceeds to the estate tax in case
the executor or administrator does not pay it. First, the statutes provide that "If any part of the gross estate consists of proceeds of policies of insurance upon the life of the decedent receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to recover
from such beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds,
in excess of $40,000, of such policies bear to the net estate." 179 The
executor is thus entitled to "require beneficiaries under insurance policies to bear their proportion of the tax." 180 Beyond that, however, the
statutes 181 also provide that a lien for the proportionate amount of the
estate tax shall apply to insurance proceeds payable to a beneficiary
other than the executor, and personal liability is imposed upon the
"transferee, trustee, or beneficiary" 182 who receives such property.
It seems likely that the liability will be placed upon both the trustee
of an insurance trust and the beneficiary of the trust. In a recent case 188
a decedent left insurance which was includable in his estate. Under
certain settlement options the proceeds of the policies were to be
retained by the insurance companies and paid out in deferred instalments. The estate was completely insolvent, and the commissioner
sought to collect the estate tax from the insurance companies. The
board upheld the commissioner and permitted recovery. In the opinion
it was said: 184
" ... Where the proceeds of a policy of insurance are paid to
a beneficiary in a lump sum upon the insured's death then of
course the beneficiary of the insurance policy is the transferee of
the proceeds of the insurance policies and not the insurance companies. The respondent so concedes."
Under this language the trustee, receiving the proceeds in a lump sum,
would be liable as a transferee. It has also now been settled, at least in
connection with the gift t~,185 that the beneficiaries of a trust are the
178

Treas. Reg. So, art. 79 (1937).
Sec. 826 (c), I. R. C. (1939); § 314 (b), Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L.
79, is substantially the same.
180
Treas. Reg. So, art. 87 (1937).
181
Sec. 315, Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. So, as amended by § 613 (b)
of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. L. 875, and as further amended by § 803 (c)
and§ 809 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 283; § 827 (b), I. R. C. (1939).
182
Sec. 827 (b), I. R. C. (1939).
183
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 42 B. T. A. 809 (1940).
184
Id. at 818.
185
See the three Supreme Court cases cited note 174, supra.
179
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real recipients of the trust, and hence liability might be imposed on
them. This would certainly be true if the trustee were merely a conduit of the funds, directed to perform no other function than to deliver the proceeds to the beneficiary. If, however, the usual condition
existed, and the trustee was to invest the funds, paying only the income
to the beneficiary, liability might stop with the trustee. Certainly the
trustee would be liable. In the case cited above, the board went on
to say: 186
" ... But where upon the death of the insured the insurance
company at the direction of the decedent pays over the proceeds of
the policy to itself, to be held on deposit for deferred settlements
with the named beneficiaries, it is a transferee. . . . we think the
word transferee as used in section 315 (b) is broad enough to
cover that situation and that the insurance companies should be
liable for the tax, limited of course to the extent provided in section 315 (b)."
This language would apply equally to trustees receiving the proceeds
and holding them for deferred payments. The board ignored the contention that the insurance company would not be interested in the correctness of the assessment and the beneficiaries would have no opportunity to litigate the amount of the assessment, saying merely that the
beneficiaries might have a right to intervene, though not deciding that
point.

III
THE GIFT TAX

The federal gift tax, after a considerable struggle 187 made its first
appearance on the statute books in 1924,188 was repealed in 1926,189
and reappeared (with some changes) 190 in 1932.191 With some modifications,192 the law is in substantially the same form now as in 1932.
186 John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 42 B. T. A. 809 at 818, 820 (1940).
187 For an interesting account of the legislative history of the gift tax, see Harriss, "Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation," 18 TAXES 531 ( 1940).
188 Secs. 319 et seq., Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. L. 313.
189 Sec. 324, Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 86.
19°For an excellent analysis of the gift tax, see Magill, "The Federal Gift Tax,"
40 CoL. L. REV. 733 (1940); HARRISS, GIFT TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1940).
191 Sec. 501 et seq., Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 245.
192 E.g., lowering the specific exemption, § 301, Revenue Act of 1935, 49 Stat.
L. 1023; lowering the annual exclusion on single gifts, § 505, Revenue Act of 1938,
50 Stat. L. 565; removing the $4,000 annual exclusion on gifts in trust, id.; increasing
the rates, § 520, Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 761, § 301, Revenue Act of
1935, 49 Stat. L. 1023, § 207, Revenue Act of 1940, 54 Stat. L. 521.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

Section moo of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 193 reads as
follows:
" (a) For the calendar year 1940 and each calendar year thereafter a tax, computed as provided in section rno1, shall be imposed
upon the transfer during such calendar year by any individual,
resident or nonresident, of property by gift. Gift taxes for the
calendar years 1932-1939, inclusive, shall not be affected by the
provisions of this chapter, but shall remain subject to the applicable provisions of the Revenue Act of 1932, except as such provisions are modified by legislation enacted subsequent to the Revenue Act of 1932.
"(b) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the
property is real or personal, tangible or intangible; but in the
case of a nonresident not a citizen of the United States, shall apply
to a transfer only if the property is situated within the United
States."
Section 1001 sets out the progressive rate of taxation,194 the rates
being three-fourths of the corresponding estate tax rates. This lesser
rate was apparently adopted to encourage gifts and secure immediate
revenue.195
Section I002 includes transfers not made for "an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth" to the extent that the
property transferred exceeds the value of the consideration. Section
rno3 provides that the first $4,000 196 of each gift made to any person
during the taxable year shall not be included in the "net gifts," except
193

53 Stat. L. 144 (1939). This is the successor to § 501, Reve~ue Act of
1932, 47 Stat. L. 245, which was amended by§ 5II, Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
L. 758. This 1934 amendment repealed subsection (c) of the original § 501 (relating
to the inapplicability of the gift tax in the case of a transfer of property in trust
subject to the power in the donor to revest title in himself) after the decision in Burnet
v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1935), which declared that the gift
tax would be inapplicable even without the statutory exclusion.
194
Sec. 207 of the Revenue Act of 1940, 54 Stat. L. 521, amends § 1001 by
increasing the rate of the gift tax for the years 1940-45 for defense tax. This defense
tax has been made permanent by the Revenue Act of 1941. See supra, note 4.
195
See Harriss, "Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation," 18 TAXES
531 (1940).
196
Formerly $5,000, Revenue Act of 1932, § 504, 47 Stat. L. 247. It is very
probable that this amount will be lowered still further. An attempt was made by the
House of Representatives in 1938 to reduce this exclusion to $3,000. See H. REP.
1860, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938), p. 61. Further reduction is advocated in a recently
published book in which the gift tax is comprehensively analyzed. HARRISS, GIFT TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 68-70 (1940).
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in case of gifts of future interests or gifts in trust, when no such exclusion is permitted.197 Section I 004 grants to citizens or residents a
specific exemption of $40,000 198 on gifts made during the year and excludes gifts to charities. Section I oo 5 provides that "If the gift is made
in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered
the amount of the gift." 199
These are the statutory provisions under which the creation of a
life insurance trust may be subject to gift tax. It is clear that a very
important tax saving can be made by any person of considerable wealth
by utilizing the $40,000 exemption to gifts and eliminating at least that
sum from his gross estate. Likewise the $4,000 annual exemption permits as many separate gifts of that amount each year to go free from
tax. Actually the savings which can be made by making inter vivos
gifts rather than leaving the property in the estate is greater than the
difference in the rates of the two taxes, because a gift, even though
taxable, will fall in the lower brackets of the gift tax and be removed
from the upper brackets of the estate tax. A life insurance policy is
"property" and a transfer thereof is a proper occasion for the imposition of a gift tax. 200 As with any transaction, the problems raised may
be grouped in three principal classes: (I) What type of transfer is
subject to the tax? (2) Assuming that the tax is to be imposed, what
value is to be placed on the property transferred? (3) What is the
extent of the deductions to be allowed under the statute?

A. What is a Taxable Transfer?
If, as has been frequently stated, the gift tax was adopted as a
supplement to the estate tax and to the income tax, 201 there is a sound
basis for the conclusion which seems to be developing in the decisions
that the general test to be applied in determining whether a transfer
is subject to a gift tax is this: Is the transfer sufficiently complete so
197
Sec. 505, Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L. 565, now denies the exclusion of
the first $4,000 when the gift is made in trust. See infra, p. 258.
198
Formerly $50,000, Revenue Act of 1932, § 505, 47 Stat. L. 247. This
exemption "may be taken in its entirety in a single year, or be spread over a period
of years in such amounts as he [donor] sees fit, but after the limit has been reached
no further exemption is allowed." Treas. Reg. 79, art. 12 (1936).
109
Subsequent sections deal with the requirements for tax returns ( time and
place of making and persons by whom they are required), time of payment, methods
of collection, procedure, deficiency assessments, penalties, refunds, etc., but are not of
particular concern here.
200
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (5) (1936).
201
Magill, "The Federal Gift Tax," 40 CoL. L. REv. 733 (1940); Harriss,
"Legisbtive History of Federal Gift Taxation," 18 TAXES 531 (1940).
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that the value of the property transferred will not be included in the
estate of the transferror and thereby subjected to the estate tax? If it
is not sufficiently complete, then no gift tax is to be imposed. The leading cases which announce this principle of exclusiveness are the companion cases Estate of Sanford 'V. Commissioner 202 and Rasquin 'V.
Humphreys,203 both involving the general question whether a gift in
trust with the power reserved in the grantor to alter the interests of
the beneficiaries but not in a manner to benefit himself was a completed gift. The rationale of the decision that no gift tax was to be
imposed was that the transfer was sufficiently incomplete to render
the property subject to an estate tax and therefore it should not be
subject to a gift tax. In the former case the Court said: 204
"There is nothing in the language of the statute, and our attention has not been directed to anything in its legislative history
to suggest that Congress had any purpose to tax gifts before the
donor had fully parted with his interest in the property given, or
that the test of the completeness of the taxed gift was to be any
di:fferent from that to be applied in determining whether the donor
has retained an interest such that it becomes subject to the estate
tax upon its extinguishment at death. The gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax. The two are in pari materia and must
be construed together."
The Court recognized that "The two taxes are not always mutually
exclusive," mentioning specifically "gifts made in contemplation of
death which are complete and taxable when made, and are also required to be included in the gross estate for purposes of the death tax." 205
Nevertheless, it reached the conclusion "that the gift tax statute does
not contemplate two taxes upon gifts not made in contemplation of
death, one upon the gift when a trust is created or when the power of
revocation, if any, is relinquished, and another on the transfer of the
same property at death because the gift previously made was incomplete." 206
This principle of correlating the gift tax and the estate tax has been
202

308 U.S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939). See also, Mabel G. Adams, 44 B. T. A.,
No. 166 (1941); Aldus C. Higgins, 44 B. T. A., No. 173 (1941).
203
308 U.S. 54, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939).
204
308 U.S. 39 at 44.
205
308 U.S. 39 at 45. Sec. 8II (c), I. R. C. (1939), provides specifically for
the inclusion in the gross estate of gifts made in contemplation of death. Sec. 8II (d)
provides for the inclusion in the gross estate of all revocable transfers.
206 308 U. S. 39 at 45·
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reiterated with increasing frequency. 207 The position defined in these
cases has now been adopted by the commissioner by a change in the
regulations. 208 With this general view in mind, we look at the particular problems of the insurance trust. How may a gift be made?
When is the gift so incomplete as to be not subject to gift tax? What
possibilities are there that there will be imposed both a gift tax at the
time of the transfer and an estate tax on the proceeds at maturity?

B. Revocable Insurance Trusts
I. Unfunded Trusts
In the unfunded trust, the policies only are transferred to the trust,
and our question here is limited to the powers reserved which are
equivalent to a power to revoke. It has already been noted that one
must look both to the insurance policy and the terms of the trust instrument in order to determine what powers are retained to the grantor
of the trust. 209
The Treasury Regulations provide with respect to insurance: 210

"If the insured assigns a life insurance policy, or designates
a beneficiary in such a policy, but does not retain what amounts
to a power of revocation ( as, for example, the right to surrender
or cancel the policy, the right to obtain a loan against the policy
or its surrender value, or a right to change the beneficiary or
assignee, if by the exercise of such latter right the proceeds of the
policy might be made payable to the insured, his estate, or otherwise for his benefit), such assignment or designation constitutes
207 In addition to the Sanford and Rasquin cases, see Hesslein v. Hoey, (C. C. A.
2d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 954, cert. den. Hoey v. Hesslein, 302 U. S. 756, 58 S. Ct.
284 (1938); First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. United States, (D. C. Ala. 1939)
25 F. Supp. 816; Emily Trevor, 40 B. T. A. 1241 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim,
288 U.S. 280, 53 S, Ct. 369 (1933); Harriet W. Rosenau, 37 B. T. A. 468 (1938);
Marrs McLean, 41 B. T. A. 1266 (1940); Ada Small Moore, 39 B. T. A. 147
(1939). See an interesting application of this principle in Margaret White Marshall,
43 B. T. A., No. 15 (1940).
208
T. D. 5010, 1940-40 INT. REv. BuLL, 13, issued September 19, 1940,
amends art. 3, Treas. Reg. 79 (1936), so that it is now provided: "But if upon a
transfer of property {whether in trust or otherwise) the donor reserves any power over
the disposition thereof, the gift may be wholly incomplete, or may be partially complete and partially incomplete, depending upon all the facts in the particular case. • ••
A gift is incomplete in every instance where a donor reserves the power to revest the
beneficial title to the property in himself. A gift is also incomplete where and to the
extent that a reserved power gives the donor the right to name new beneficiaries or
to change the interests of the beneficiaries as between themselves."
209
See supra, note 136.
210
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (5) (1936).
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a gift even though the right of the assignee or beneficiary to
receive the proceeds is conditioned upon his surviving the insured."
By inference, when any of the powers named are reserved by the
policy to the settlor, the creation of a life insurance trust does not involve a taxable gift. 211. Or, if a power of revocation is reserved in the
trust instrument, no taxable gift occurs until such power is relinquished. 212 A power reserved to alter the beneficial interests,213 or to
revoke after ten years, 214 will result in no gift tax liability until the
power ends.

(a) Effect of Possibility of Reverter
Until recently there appeared little question that a reservation of
what is termed a "possibility of reverter" was not enough to prevent
the gift tax from being due. The regulations 215 provide that "even
though the right of the assignee or beneficiary to receive the proceeds
is conditioned upon his surviving the insured," the transfer of a policy
would constitute a completed gift. Such an interest conversely was not
sufficient to render the proceeds subject to an estate tax. 216 It has been
pointed out, however/11 that recent cases have rewritten the law in_
regard to the estate tax, and the retention of a "possibility of reverter''
by the decedent now renders the property includable in the gross estate
because there is a "shifting of economic benefits" brought about by the
death of the holder of such possibility of reverter. If these cases constitute the present rule with respect to estate tax, ·and if the gift tax
regulations previously quoted 218 constitute the rule for imposition of
the gift tax, then a transfer of an insurance policy, in trust or other211

It is extremely important in this connection to determine whether to create the
trust by a change of beneficiary or by assignment. See generally, STEPHENSON, LIVING
TRUSTS, 2d ed., 245-254 (1937). Note, however, that the reservation of such powers
subjects the proceeds to estate tax under§ 811 (g), I. R. C. (1939).
212
Orrin G. Wood, 40 B. T. A. 905 (1939).
218
Emory May Holden Norweb, 41 B. T. A. 179 (1940); Estate of Sanford
v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939); Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308
u. s.21454, 60 s. Ct. 60 (1939); T. D. 5010, 1940-40 INT. REV. BULL. 13.
Emily Trevor, 40 B. T. A. 1241 (1939).
215
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (5) (1936).
216
Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211, 56 S. Ct. 180 (1935); Helvering
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78 (1935); Industrial Trust Co. v. United
States, 296 U.S. 220, 56 S. Ct. 182 (1936). See also Helvering v. Parker, (C. C. A.
8th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 838; Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d)
613.
217
Supra, pp. 233-234.
218
Supra, at note 215.
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wise, where the policy ( or the trust instrument) provides for the
payment of proceeds to the estate of the insured if he survives the
beneficiary, will subject the transaction to a gift tax and still leave the
proceeds includable in the gross estate.219
Such a result is entirely possible and, indeed, seems to be the
present rule. The present estate tax regulations 220 provide that "the
insured possesses a legal incident of ownership if his death is necessary to terminate his interest in the insurance, as, for example, if the
proceeds would become payable to his estate, or payable as he might
direct, should the beneficiary predecease him."
In Chase National Bank of the City of New York v. United
States,221 the court was engaged with the question whether the proceeds
were includable in the gross estate, and, as indicated above, followed
the Hallock decision 222 in imposing the estate tax. It is of interest,
however, to note the language of the court: :m
" ..• The theory of taxation closely resembles that applied
to joint tenancies. There, upon the death of one of the joint tenants, the entire res must be included in his gross estate so far as
it was derived from his property."
It is familiar learning that joint tenancies,m along with gifts made
in contemplation of death, 225 are subjected to both gift and estate taxation. If the language quoted can be taken at its face value, it may
indicate that the transfer of an insurance policy will take its place
beside those two types of transfer, and be subjected to both taxes.226
219
Such a result has been predicted. See Nash, "Implications of Some Recent
Developments in the Taxation of Trusts," 18 TAXES 267, 319 at 325 (1940).
220
T. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REV. BuLL. 15, amending art. 27, Treas. Reg. 80
(1937).
221
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) l 16 F. (2d) 625. The same result was reached in
Broderick v. Keefe, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 293.
222
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
228
116 F. (2d) 625 at 627.
224
See Treas. Reg. 79, art. 19 (8) (1936), and Treas. Reg. 80, arts. 22, 23
(1937); § 302 (e), Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 71, as amended by § 404 of
the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 754. See Tyler v. United States, 28 I U. S.
497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930); Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 224, 53 S. Ct. 157
(1933); Griswold v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 56, 54 S. Ct. 5 (1933).
225
Sec. 302 (c), Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 70, as amended by Joint
Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. L. 1516, by§ 803 (a) of the Revenue Act of
1932, 47 Stat. L. 279, and by § 401 of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 752.
See Treas. Reg. 80, art. 16 (1937); United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S. Ct.
446 (1931).
226
But see Helburn v. Ballard, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 613; Walker
v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 103; Thomas C. Boswell, 37
B. T. A. 970 (1938).
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On the other hand, if the rationale of the Sanford and Rasquin
cases 221 be applied, the fact that the proceeds are includable in the
estate will be ground for withholding the imposition of the gift tax
at the time of the transfer. Withholding the gift tax on a transfer
where the grantor had only a "possibility of reverter" would weaken
this tax to that extent, and it has been suggested that no such action
will be taken. 228

(b) Effect of Payment of Premiums
The unfunded insurance trust, as most often used, always contemplates that the insured-grantor pay the premiums upon the insurance in the trust, even after the trust is established. A serious question
has arisen as to whether a trust of insurance where the grantor continues to pay the premiums on the insurance shall be considered an
incomplete gift regardless of his surrender of all other incidents of
ownership. Again the matter is closely tied up with the provisions of
the estate tax,220 and the treatment accorded such insurance in connection with the estate tax.
Assuming now that the grantor has placed insurance in trust, and
has surrendered all rights to change beneficiaries, to surrender the
policy for cash, to obtain loans against the policy or to revoke an assignment of the policy, and all other recognized "incidents of ownership," does the fact that he continues to pay premiums constitute an
incident of ownership so as to render the proceeds taxable in his estate?
If so ( and it seems very likely that such is the case), should it therefore be held that there is not a taxable gift or shall both taxes be imposed?
The gift tax regulations apparently contemplate that a gift tax on
the value of the policy is to be imposed at the time the insured divests
himself of the above-named rights,2 30 and specifically provide that the
subsequent payments of premiums shall be considered gifts.281 Assuredly the beneficiary named in such a policy acquires vested rights
which cannot be taken away from him without his consent.282 There
227

Supra, notes 202 and 203. See also cases cited supra, note 207.
Nash, "Implications of Some Recent Developments in the Taxation of Trusts,"
18 TAXES 267, 319 at 325 (1940).
229
Sec. 8II (g), I. R. C. (1939); formerly § 302 (g), Revenue Act of 1926,
44 Stat. L. 70.
280
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (5) (1936).
281
Id., art. 2 (6).
282 See, generally, Vance, "The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy,"
31 YALE L. J. 343 (1922).
228
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seems to be no reason for a change in this aspect of taxation. If one
chooses to make a gift of an insurance policy, he must pay the tax
thereon, and the payment of added premiums constitutes an indirect gift
to the beneficiary named in the policy.
There has been an attempt made, however, to include the proceeds
of policies on which the insured paid the premiums, regardless of
whether he retained any other incidents of ownership. The complete
history of the estate tax regulations in this regard has been discussed,288
and for present purposes it is enough to recall that articles 2 5 and 2 7
of the 1937 edition of Treasury Regulations 80 were revised on January 10, 1941,m and under these revised regulations the proceeds of all
insurance "taken out by the decedent" are to be included in the gross
estate. Whether a policy is "taken out by the decedent" depends upon
whether he paid a part or all of the premiums, at least as to insurance
taken out after January 10, 1941.285 If the insurance is taken out before
that date, the old regulations apply, and the taxability of the proceeds
under the estate tax depends upon whether the insured retained "incidents of ownership."
This change in the regulations is probably an attempt of the commissioner to take advantage of the original 286 and the modified 281
opinion in the Bailey case. While there are cases which will have to
be reconciled when a final test of the matter is made,2811 it seems clear
that at the present time, the creation of an unfunded life insurance
trust will, if the policies be irrevocably assigned, result in the imposition of a gift tax on the value of the policy; a gift tax on the amount
of each annual premium paid thereafter; 289 and an estate tax on the
proceeds of the policies in excess of the $40,000 specific exemption. Just
as it would weaken the gift tax to fail to impose a gift tax where the
settlor of a trust retained a "possibility of reverter," 240 so would it
288
2

Supra, pp. 221-228.
HT. D. 5032, 1941-3 INT. REV. BULL. 13.

235
286

Id.

(Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617.
(Ct. Cl. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184.
288
Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929);
Chase Nat. Bank of the City of New York v. United States, (D. C. N. Y. 1939)
28 F. Supp. 947, reversed on other grounds (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II6 F. (2d) 625;
Old Point Nat. Bank, Exr., 39 B. T. A. 343 (1939).
289 Since 1938, no $4,000 exclusion is permitted to gifts in trust, Revenue Act of
1938, § 505, 52 Stat. L. 565, and it may be that the gift of a premium payment
on insurance placed in trust would be considered a "gift in trust." In such case it
would be better for the taxpayer to transfer the cash to the beneficiary outright.
240
Supra, note 228.
287
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weaken the gift tax so far as the transfer of life insurance policies is
concerned to fail to impose a gift tax at the time the insured divested
himself of all rights under the policies and vested them in someone
else. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the doctrine of mutual exclusiveness announced in the Sanford case will be applied to this situation.
2.

Funded Trusts

In the funded revocable trust, income-producing property is transferred together with the insurance policies, the trustee being directed·
to apply the income from such property to the payment of the premiums on
the insurance. This fact does not give rise to any additional problems in
connection with the determination of what constitutes a taxable transfer.241
Since the question again to be determined is whether the powers reserved in the trust instrument are sufficient to render the gift incomplete or whether the settlor has parted with control over the property
transferred, the principles discussed in the previous section will apply
as well to the transfer of the securities as to that of the insurance
policies.
Likewise no separate discussion will be made of irrevocable transfers, it being implicit in the foregoing discussion that, if the transfer is
found to be complete and irrevocable, a gift tax will be imposed, and
the sole questions become those of valuation and possible deductions
which are discussed in the following sections.

C. Valuation of Life Insurance Gifts
I.

Unfunded Trusts

In the unfunded trust, only the insurance policy or policies are
transferred, and the problem of valuation is just the same in the insurance trust as it is in the case of an irrevocable assignment of the
policy or in the case of irrevocably naming a beneficiary of a policy.
Section roo5 of the Internal Revenue Code of r939 242 provides
that "If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of
the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift." The original
regulations 243 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in r 93 2 provided that "The irrevocable assignment of a life insurance policy, or the
naming of the beneficiary of a policy without retaining any of the legal
241

The funded trust raises a question of valuation, discussed infra, pp. 255-256.
Originally § 506, Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat, L. 248.
243
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (5) (1932).
242
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incidents of ownership therein, constitutes a gift in the amount of the
net cash surrender value, if any, plus the prepaid insurance adjusted to
the date of the gift." Under these regulations a long line of cases established the rule that the cash surrender value was the criterion for
valuation of gifts of life insurance.244
In 1936, the regulations were changed 245 to provide that
"The value of a life insurance contract or of a contract for the
payment of an annuity issued by a company regularly engaged in the
selling of contracts of that character is established through the sale of
the particular contract by the company, or through the sale by the
company of comparable contracts. As valuation through sale of
comparable contracts is not readily ascertainable when the gift is
of a contract which has been in force for some time and on which
further premium payments are to be made, the value may be
approximated, unless because of the unusual nature of the contract
such approximation is not reasonably close to the full value, by
adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at the date of the gift
the proportionate part of the gross premium last paid before the
date of the gift which covers the period extending beyond that
date."
Several examples are given.
It is apparent that the exceptional character of insurance policies
makes for difficulty in determining "value." But the principal question
now is whether an insurance contract has a greater value than the mere
cash surrender value,

(a) Single Premium Policies and Paid Up Policies
The question of value of single premium policies has been settled
by the Supreme Court in three cases decided February 3, 1941, with
opinions by Justice Douglas, resolving a conflict which had existed
among the circuit courts of appeals. 246
In Guggenheim v. Rasquin,241 the taxpayer had purchased single
244
See Helvering v. Bryan, (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 430, and cases
cited therein; Brown v. Deputy, (D. C. Del. 1940) 30 F. Supp. 860; Orrin G. Wood,
40 B. T. A. 905 (1939).
245
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 19 (9) (1936). Italics supplied.
246
Holding that the cash surrender value was the value of the gift: Commissioner
v. Haines, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 854; Helvering v. Cronin, (C. C. A.
8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 907; United States v. Ryerson, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 114
F. (2d) 150. Holding otherwise: Commissioner v. Powers, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
II5 F. (2d) 209; Guggenheim v. Rasquin, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 371.
247
312 U.S. 254, 61 S. Ct. 507 (1941), affg. (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 110 F.
(2d) 371.
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premium life insurance policies at a cost of $852,438.50, the face
amount of such policies being $1,000,000. At about the same time she
assigned them irrevocably to three of her children, and in making her
gift tax return she listed the policies at a value equivalent to their cash
surrender value of $717,344.81. A deficiency was determined by the
commissioner who placed a value on the policies equivalent to the cost
of the policies. The suit was for a refund of the tax paid under the
deficiency assessment. The circuit court of appeals upheld the commissioner, and the Supreme Court affirmed .the decision, saying: 248
". . . Surrender of a policy represents only one of the rights
of the insured or beneficiary. Plainly that right is one of the substantial legal incidents of ownership. . .. But the owner of a fully
paid life insurance policy has more than the mere right to surrender it; he has the right to retain it for its investment virtues
and to receive the face amount of the policy upon the insured's
death. That these latter rights are deemed by purchasers of insurance to have substantial value is clear from the difference
between the cost of a single-premium policy and its immediate or
early cash-surrender value-in the instant case over $135,000. All
of the economic benefits of a policy must be taken into consideration in determining its value for gift-tax purposes. To single out
one and disregard the others is in effect to substitute a different
property interest for the one which was the subject of the gift.
In this situation as in pthers [ citing case] an important element
in the value of the property is the use to which it may be put.
Certainly the petitioner here did not expend $852,438.50 to make
an immediate gift limited to $717,344.81. Presumptively the
value of these policies at the date of the gift was the amount which
the insured had expended to acquire them. Cost is cogent evidence
of value. And here it is the only suggested criterion which reflects
the value to the owner of the entire bundle of rights in a singlepremium policy-the right to retain it as well as surrender it."
In United States v. Ryerson,249 decided at the same time, the insured had acquired single premium policies and retained them five or
six years before the irrevocable assignment was made. At the time of
the gift the cash surrender value was greater than the cost price, and
the cost of replacement of the policies at the then age of the insured
was greater than the cash surrender value. The Supreme Court held
248

ld., 312 U.S. 254 at 257-258.
312 U. S. 260, 61 S. Ct. 479 (1941), reversing (C. C. A. 7th, 1940)
114 F. (2d) 150.
249
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that the replacement cost at the time of the gift was the proper basis
for valuation under the gift tax statute, saying: 250
". • • We think that such cost of replacement, as held by the
District Court, is the best available criterion of the value of the
policies for the purposes of the gift tax. The elapse of time between issuance and assignment of the policies does not justify
the substitution of the cash-surrender value for replacement cost
as the criterion of value. We cannot assume with respondents
that at the dates of the gifts the policies presumably had no insurance, as distinguished from investment, value to the donor.
Here, as in the case where the issuance of the policies and their
assignments as gifts are simultaneous, cash-surrender value reflects only a part of the value of the contracts. The cost of duplicating the policies at the dates of the gifts is, in the absence of
more cogent evidence, the one criterion which reflects both their
insurance and investment value to the owner at that time."

Powers v. Commissioner,251 the third case, merely affirmed the
proposition that cost of replacement at the date of the gift was the
criterion to be used for determination of value.
While all of these cases involved single premium contracts of insurance, it appears that the same result would follow in case of a fully
paid insurance contract.252 But where the gift is of an ordinary life
policy, or any insurance contract upon which premiums are being
paid, the question remains unanswered.

(b) Where Premium Payments are to Continue After
the Date of the Gift
Assuming that the continued payment of premiums by the insured
is not sufficient to make the gift incomplete, the creation of the normal
unfunded insurance trust would not involve the transfer of- a fully
paid policy, but would rather contemplate the continued payment of
premiums by the insured-grantor. As indicated, the present regulations provide in such cases that the gift of the policy is measured by
the interpolated terminal reserve value at the date of the gift plus the
proportionate part of the gross premium last paid before the date
250

Id., 312 U. S. at 261.
312 U. S. 259, 61 S. Ct. 509 (1941), a.ffg. (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) n5 F.
(2d) 209.
252
See the language in Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254, 61 S. Ct. 507
(1941). See also 54 HARV. L. REv. 894 (1941), suggesting that a policy transferred
after the insured had become uninsurable would have a still greater value to the insured.
251
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of the gift which covers the period extending beyond that date,253 and
indicate further that "valuation through sale of comparable contracts
is not readily ascertainable when the gift is of a contract which has been
in force for some time and on which further premium payments are
to be made." 254 The Supreme Court cases above cited do not purport to
pass upon the question of value of any other type of policy than those
before the Court, but have this to say with regard to the administrative
regulations: 255
"Petitioner, however, argues that cash-surrender value was
made the measure of value by Article 2 (5), Treasury Regulations 79, promulgated October 36, 1933,256 which provided that
the 'irrevocable assignment of a life insurance policy ... constitutes a gift in the amount of the net cash surrender value, if any,
plus the prepaid insurance adjusted to the date of the gift.' The
argument is that under this regulation the reserve in case of a
single-premium policy covers the prepaid insurance and represents the entire value of the policy. The regulation is somewhat
ambiguous. But in our view it applied only to policies upon which
current premiums were still being paid at the date of the gift,
not to single-premium policies. Accordingly, the problem here
involves an interpretation of the meaning of 'value' in section 506,
unaided by an interpretative regulation."
Whether this is an approval of the regulations as applied to policies upon which current premiums are still being paid is far from clear.
It may well be that the opinions will result in an effort to assess a
greater value to insurance policies where premiums remain to be paid.
While the interpolated terminal reserve value may fairly be said to
represent the investment value of a partly paid insurance contract, it
seems clear that there is an insurance value to such a contract which
under the present regulation~ is measured by the amount of premium
paid to secure such insurance. The question will be whether the premium paid does or does not represent the "insurance" value. Any attempt
to assess a greater value would certainly be contrary to the general
provision for determining value, that is, the market value in a willingbuyer-willing-seller relation, since the premium is just the cost of
258

Treas. Reg. 79, art. 19 (9) (1936), and examples given.
Treas. Reg. 79, art. 19 (9) (1936).
255
Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254 at 258, 61 S. Ct. 507 (1941)
( italics supplied).
256
The predecessor of present Treas. Reg. 79, art. 19 ( 9).
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obtaining such insurance. It seems likely, therefore, that the regulations
will continue to represent the method of assessing value of policies.
Where assignee or beneficiary contributes to the payment of premiums, that proportion of the value represented by the proportion of
premiums paid by the beneficiary or assignee will be excluded from the
gift. 257 But where premiums are paid by the insured from community
funds (in a community property state), the entire value of the contract
at the date of the gift is considered the value of the gift. 258
2.

Funded Trusts

In the funded trust, in addition to the life insurance policies, the
grantor transfers income-producing property to the trustee, the income
from which is to be utilized to pay the premiums on the insurance.
Until recently there appears to have been no dispute over the inclusion
of the value of these securities under the gift tax statute. However, it
should be remembered that such of the income used to pay the premiums on insurance on the grantor's life is taxable to the grantor. 259 If
the securities are thus considered "owned" by the grantor to the extent
of taxing him on the income, should they not be considered as still
owned by him and excluded from the gift tax? This argument was
made successfully before the Board of Tax Appeals in the recent case
of Martin Beck. 260 There the taxpayer had created an irrevocable
funded insurance trust, transferring securities of a value of $ I 72,000
and seven policies of insurance. The income from the securities was
to be used to pay premiums on the insurance, and any balance was to be
distributed to the wife and daughters of the grantor who were also
beneficiaries of the trust after the death of the taxpayer. The trust
was to continue during the lives of the wife and daughters, with remainders over, with no possibility of reversion to the grantor. The
taxpayer reported the total value of the securities and the insurance
policies, but deducted therefrom $49,926.65, which he claimed was the
capitalized value of the income necessary to pay the premiums during
his life, based on the amount of annual premiums and the life expectancy of the insured-grantor. The commissioner objected to the
257

Elizabeth S. Kirk, 39 B. T. A. 902 (1939).
Blaffer v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 489, cert. den.
308 U. S. 576, 60 S. Ct. 91 (1939); Farish v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 5th, 1939)
103 F. (2d) IOI I.
259
Sec. 167 (a) (3), I. R. C. (1939); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53
S. Ct. 761 (1933). See discussion of income tax, supra, pp. 210-212.
260
43 B. T. A., No. 23 (1940).
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deduction, but the board agreed with the taxpayer and permitted it.
The board, after noting that the income was taxable to the grantor
under the statute and the authority of the Wells case, said: 261
"The Court in the Wells case reached the conclusion that the
insured in such cases, by providing that the income of the trust
shall be used to pay premiums on policies of insurance on his own
life, has reserved to himself economic benefits in the property.
If those benefits are of sufficient importance to justify taxation to
him of the: income used to pay the premiums, then it is difficult
to see why they are not of sufficient importance to prevent the
imposition of a gift tax. 262 In other words, the petitioner in effect
reserved to himself a life estate in the income sufficient to pay the
premiums on his contracts of insurance. . • • We have seen that
the value of a retained life estate must be subtracted before the
value of the taxable gift can be determined. It follows that the
present petitioner made a gift of less than the total value of the
securities and insurance policies at the time of the transfer."
The reasoning of the board would appear to be sound if an exact
correlation is to be reached between the gift tax and the income tax as
well as between the gift tax and the estate tax. It should be noted, of
course, that the board reserved the question whether the annual payments of premiums made from the income of the trust would be considered gifts in themselves, just as annual payments of premiums are
considered gifts when they are made directly by the insured and not
by means of the funded trust.263 This would appear to be a natural
consequence of such a holding, since if such income is "owned" by
the grantor and expended for insurance, the fruits of which are irrevocably assigned to another, such expenditure is a gift to the one who
will receive the fruits. 264
Id. at p. 4.
A footnote at this point reads: "The case of Commissioner v. Krebs [(C. C. A.
3d, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 880] would appear on its face to be to the contrary, but the
question now decided and the possible effect of the Wells case were not considered
in the Krebs case. See also J. C. Hormel [39 B. T. A. 244 (1939), revd. Helvering
v. Hormel, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) I II F. (2d) 1, cert. granted 3 II U. S. 626, 61
S. Ct. 35 (1940) ], where the Commissioner conceded that the gift tax was due
only in case the income was not taxable to the grantor." The decision of the circuit
court in the Hormel case was later affirmed. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552,
61 S. Ct. 719 (1941).
263
See footnote 2 in the opinion in Martin Beck, 43 B. T. A., No. 23 (1940).
264
See Treas. Reg. 79, art. 2 (6) (1936); Jack L. Warner, 42 B. T. A. 954
(1940).
261
262
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D. Deductions
Until r938, a taxpayer was entitled, in the case of a gift made in
trust, to his specific deduction of $40,000; 265 in addition the first $5,ooo
of any gift made to a person ( except future interests in property) was
not included in determining the net taxable gift.266 These deductions
would apply as well to insurance trusts as to trusts of other property.
Among the questions which arose under this latter provision were:
(I) Where there are several beneficiaries of a trust, is the taxpayer
entitled to a deduction for each beneficiary, or entitled to only one
deduction for the gift to the trust? ( 2) Where there are multiple
trusts, each for the same beneficiary, is the taxpayer entitled to a deduction for each trust or only for the beneficiary? Both these questions
involve merely the problem who is the donee of a gift in trust-the
trustee or the beneficiary; but strangely enough cases arose holding in
favor of the taxpayer in both instances, allowing deductions for each
beneficiary,267 and allowing deductions for separate trusts for the same
beneficiary.268 It has now been resolved by the Supreme Court that the
265
Sec. 505, Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 247: "In computing net gifts for
any calendar year there shall be allowed as deductions: (a) in the case of a citizen or
resident-(1) An exemption of $50,000, less the aggregate of the amounts claimed
and allowed as specific exemption for preceding calendar years." This amount was
reduced to $40,000 by§ 301 (b), Revenue Act of 1935, 49 Stat. L. 1025.
266
Sec. 504 (b), Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 247: "In the case of gifts
(other than of future interests in property) made to any person by, the donor during
the calendar year, the first $5,000 of such gifts to such person shall not, for the
purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during such
year." (Amended by § 505, Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L. 565, denying the
exclusion to gifts in trust and reducing the amount to $4,000.)
267
Hutchings v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) I II F. ( 2d) 229, affd.
Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U. S. 393, 61, S. Ct. 653 (1941); United States v.
Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659 (1941); United States v. Ryerson, 312 U. S.
405, 61 S. Ct. 479 (1941), reversing a contrary holding in Ryerson v. United States,
(C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 150; Davidson v. Welch, (D. C. Mass. 1938) 22
F. Supp. 726, affd. in Welch v. Davidson, (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 100,
noted in 86 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 907 (1938); Katherine S. Rheinstrom, 37 B. T. A.
308 (1938), affd. in part Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105
F. (2d) 642; Robertson v. Nee, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 651; McBrier v.
Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 967; Edwin Goodman, 41 B. T. A.
472 (1940); Mary DuPont Faulkner, 41 B. T. A. 875 (1940); Jack L. Warner, 42
B. T. A. 954 (1940); Wilton Rubinstein, 41 B. T. A. 220 (1940); J. Willis Gardner,
41 B. T. A. 679 (1940).
268
Commissioner v. Wells, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 339; Commissioner
v. Krebs, (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 880 at 881, stating: "Inasmuch as the term
'person' is defined by section I 11 I of the act to include a trust or estate the trust estates
here involved must be held to be those persons to whom the gifts were made within
the meaning of section 504 (b)." See also Edwin B. Cox, 38 B. T. A. 865 (1938).
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beneficiaries of the trust are the real donees of a gift in trust.269 For
gifts made at the present time, however, no such questions will arise,
due to an amendment introduced by the Revenue Act of r938, which,
in addition to lowering the deduction to $4,000, provided that no
deduction was to be allowed in cases of gifts to trusts.270 The Senate
Committee on Finance, in introducing the amendment said: 271
"· •. The Board of Tax Appeals and several of the Federal
courts have held, with respect to gifts in trust, that the trust entities were the donees and on that account the gifts were of present
and not of future interests. The statute, as thus construed, affords
ready means of tax avoidance, since a donor may create any number of trusts in the same year in favor of the same beneficiary with
a $5,000 exclusion applying to each trust, whereas the gifts, if
made otherwise than in trust, would in no case be subject to more
than a single exclusion of $5,ooo."
Thus, for gifts made after r938, if the gift is made by way of an inter
vivos trust, no deduction of the first $4,000 is permitted. Only the
specific exemption of $40,000 is accessible to the creator of a trust.272
The two major conclusions which may be drawn from the foregoing discussion appear somewhat contradictory, but are nevertheless
conclusions faced by every attorney who seeks to advise a client concerning the advisability of creating or the provisions to be included in
an insurance trust.
The first is very nearly a truism: no one can or should recommend
or attempt to draft an insurance trust agreement without a thoroughgoing knowledge of the tax consequences of each particular provision.
The present laws and administrative regulations, interpreted by hundreds of judicial decisions, leave open to the intelligent estate planner
numerous ways of lightening the taxpayer's burden. The counsellor's
But see the three cases decided by the Supreme Court on March 3, 1941: Helvering
v. Hutchings, 312 U. S. 393, 61 S. Ct. 653 (1941); United States v. Pelzer, 312
U. S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659 (1941); and United States v. Ryerson, 312 U. S. 405, 61
S. Ct. 479 (1941).
269
See the three Supreme Court cases cited supra, note 268.
270
Sec. 505, Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L. 565, now I. R. C. (1939), § 1003.
71
~
S. REP. 1567, 75th Cong. 3d sess. (1941), p. 41. It might also be noted that
the original bill introduced in the House had recommended that the deduction be
reduced to $3,000 (H. REP. 1860, p. 61), which figure was raised to $4,000 in joint
conference after the Senate had reinstated the $5,000 deduction.
272
I. R. C. (1939), § 1004. An attempt was made by the Committee on Ways
and Means in 1938 to combine this exemption with the $40,000 estate tax exemption
and permit only one $40,000 exemption on either gift tax or estate tax. H. REP.
1860, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938), p. 60.
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task is to be constantly aware of the methods which have been legislatively or judicially approved for reaching this result.
The second conclusion is this: despite their importance, tax considerations must frequently yield to other desires of the creator of the
insurance trust. It is clear that the real justification, the real basis for
establishing an insurance trust lies in the efficacy with which such a
property arrangement can serve to create or preserve an estate or to
provide for dependents. These ends must first be attained. That the
best laid plan for tax avoidance can be rendered nugatory overnight, by
a statute, judicial decision, or administrative action, must be evident
from the foregoing pages. Faced with this prospect, it would be folly
to upset the wishes of the grantor of the trust solely for the purpose
of saving taxes. That is, if a choice must be made between provisions
which may lessen tax liability and provisions which will clearly e:ffectuate the beneficent purposes sought by the creator of the trust, the
latter must prevail.

